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THE FEDERATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA

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CHAPTER VI

THE AFTERMATH OF BARRIOS'S DEFEAT, 1885-1894

The defeat of Barrios did not prove to the more ambitious leaders of Central America that the project for which he gave his life was utterly hopeless. Perhaps his attempt, though ending in utter failure, inspired others to follow his example.

The first attempt after the defeat of Barrios was made within a week after the declaration of peace, and by none other than the President of Salvador. Zaldivar submitted a proposition by a circular to the four states, inviting their coöperation in bringing about a union of the States under one central organization. Each state was invited to send five plenipotentiary delegates to a Congress, which it was proposed should meet at Santa Recla, Salvador, May 15, 1885. This Congress was to have full powers to adopt a federal constitution, and other measures necessary for carrying out the proposed union. At the same time, Zaldivar announced his firm determination to retire from the government of Salvador, and only to wait there for the action of the proposed Congress. This proposition had the appearance of a purpose on Zaldivar's part to take up the project Barrios initiated in 1875. Where Barrios failed, Zaldivar could not hope to succeed.

Guatemala replied that the proposal was premature so soon after the recent failure; Costa Rica also declined the invitation in similar terms; Nicaragua rejected the plan with illy disguised contempt, while Honduras alone accepted.²¹⁶

On September 12, 1885, a more hopeful event occurred; a treaty was signed between Guatemala, Salvador, and

²¹⁶ *For. Rel.*, 1885, p. 118. Leon, pp. 55, 56.

Honduras, embracing the following subjects: peace, friendship, union, alliance, extradition, commercial reciprocity, and postal telegraph and monetary union. Nicaragua and Costa Rica were invited to become parties to the treaty, but they found many of its stipulations objectionable, and declined.²¹⁷

The effort did not end with this refusal. July 31, 1886, Fernando Cruz, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, addressed a circular note to the Central American governments inviting their acceptance of the treaty, with such modifications as would remove the objectionable features, or, if preferred, that they should enter into a new treaty embracing the same objects. The answers were so encouraging that President Barillas, in the name of the government of Guatemala, issued another circular note December 15, 1886, inviting the states to send delegates to a Congress, and proposing that it should meet in Guatemala, January 20, 1886. The purpose of the Congress was stated to be the discussion and adoption of a general treaty, which would assure the peace and the mutual friendship and harmony of the Central American States. This invitation was cordially accepted by all the states. The delegates met at the appointed time and the discussion continued until February 16, 1887.²¹⁸

On that date three instruments were agreed upon and adopted, a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce; a treaty relating to extradition, and a consular convention. The first is important for the question of federation, since it contained a protocol declaring that the desire to establish appropriate bases for the political union of Central America was one reason for the treaty. The principle of arbitration for the settlement of all disputes was adopted in Article I. More important yet, it was stipulated that there should be a general Congress of all the states every two years for the discussion of matters of mutual interest. They agreed to use their influence in promoting the political union of the states, and expressed the hope that by the time of the Con-

²¹⁷ *For. Rel.*, 1887, p. 85.

²¹⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1887, p. 86.

gress of 1890 the obstacles to union might be removed. They empowered the Congress that was to meet at that time to take preliminary steps towards federation.²¹⁹ They feared, however, at the time, that these finest of sentiments and best of intentions would come to nothing by reason of jealous officials and a hopeless population;²²⁰ this fear was soon realized as difficulties arose between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, growing out of the alleged encroachment of Costa Rica on the San Juan River.²²¹

The first biennial meeting according to the treaty signed February 16, 1887, was held at San José de Costa Rica, in 1888. The treaty had been ratified unconditionally by all the states except Nicaragua, which state, however, was to be represented at the Congress.²²²

In February, 1888, a rumor circulated throughout Central America that General Barillas, successor to General Barrios, intended to revive the plan to consolidate the republics. Increasing disquietude was felt in Nicaragua. The United States strongly disapproved of coercion and constraint by one or more of the Central American States toward their neighbors to bring about the union, and the rumors were declared to be unfounded by the government of Guatemala. Salvador Barrutia, a Guatemalan minister, suggested in a letter to Mr. Hall, March 17, 1888, that the rumors came solely from Nicaragua, where they had been invented and sustained by a few emigré enemies of the present political system of Guatemala:

In order to carry out their revolutionary projects against the government, they promoted all kinds of animosities against my government. Aside from the personal convictions which the President of the Republic and the persons who compose his cabinet entertain in regard to the loyalty and desirability of the Central American Union, I should state . . . that according to our Constitution, Article 2, the Guatemalan nation will always be ready to reincorporate itself with the Central American nationality At any time and under whatever circumstances, however difficult, whenever on the part of one or

²¹⁹ *For. Rel.*, 1887, pp. 100, 101. *Nation*, July 21, 1887, p. 48.

²²⁰ *Nation*, July 21, 1887, p. 48.

²²¹ *For. Rel.*, 1887, p. 110.

²²² *For. Rel.*, 1888, pt. 1, p. 165.

more of the Central American republics, the idea of a union should be developed, the people and government of Guatemala, in use of their undoubted sovereignty, without egotism and without any spirit of domination, will always be disposed to make use within the limits of the law and by lawful means, of whatever in their judgment may conduce for the general and permanent good to the effective national reconstruction of Central America.²²³

Mr. Hall was not satisfied and sent another message to the Guatemalan government. He received a curt rejoinder, Guatemala reiterating her determination to employ

for the consummation of the long-desired Central American Union, the legitimate means to be formed within the limits of the law.²²⁴

At the Congress held at the capital of Costa Rica in 1888, nothing vital transpired, but the next year at a Congress convened October 15, 1889 at San Salvador, a provisional pact of union was drawn up. The "Republica de Centro-America" should have inaugurated its government on September 15, 1890. Honduras ratified the treaty March 6, 1890; Salvador, March 14, and Guatemala, March 23. Costa Rica refused to join. The diet was to meet August 20.

With fatal consequence a revolution broke out in Salvador June 20, 1890. The President was assassinated, and the adversaries to union pushed themselves into power. Guatemala would not recognize the new government; issued a proclamation June 27, denouncing the revolution in Salvador, and declared war. Two United States ships of war were sent to the coast of Salvador and Guatemala to protect American interests as hostilities were imminent. The fortune of arms was with the adversaries and the union project could not be executed.²²⁵ The disturbances were ended by the signing of a treaty July 9, 1890, securing constitutional government in Salvador, and requesting the good offices and moral support of the United States. Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica signed the treaty, Hon-

²²³ *For. Rel.*, 1888, pt. 1, p. 147.

²²⁴ *For. Rel.*, 1888, pt. 1, p. 148.

²²⁵ *Rey, La Union Centro-Am. For. Rel.*, 1890, pp. 28-32.

duras consenting to it by telegraph. The Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Relations, proposed the insertion of the following article:

It is resolved that, peace being restored, the governments here represented should continue their peaceful measures having in view the union of Central America agreeably to the compact entered into at San Salvador, October 15, 1889.

The ministers of Costa Rica and Nicaragua accepted this article and Honduras acceded by telegraph. At the moment in which the treaty of Union was to be put into effect, "the old monster, the revolutionary hydra, made his appearance and put obstacles in the way of its completion."²²⁶

The idea of union had become so fixed in the consciousness of Central America that it was almost an obsession. General J. M. Barrundia was a prominent friend of union during these troubled times. Secretary of War under Barrios of Guatemala, he aspired to the presidency, and was exiled by the authorities. He threatened an invasion of Guatemala from Mexico, but was disarmed by Mexico. While on his way to Salvador, with which Guatemala was at war, he resisted arrest by the Guatemalan officers on the steamer *Acapulco*, in the port of San José, August 28, 1890. Accused of being guilty of high treason and other crimes against his native land he fired upon the officers and captain and was himself killed. In his stateroom was found a proclamation to Guatemala, setting forth the principles which the revolution proclaimed:

to procure by pacific means and mutual agreement with the other republics of Central America, the reconstruction of a single country.²²⁷

The next expression of the common desire for closer relations among the republics was less visionary and more practical. A treaty of peace and arbitration was agreed upon at San Salvador, May 23, 1892. As this pact formed the basis for several succeeding agreements, rather a full account of it seems required. The introduction states:

²²⁶ Barilla, in *For. Rel.*, 1890, p. 47.

²²⁷ *For. Rel.*, 1890, p. 112.

The governments of Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Guatemala represented in the Central American Peace Congress, through their respective plenipotentiaries . . . wishing to insure the benefits of peace between the Republics of Central America, and to strengthen at the same time the sentiments of brotherhood which must serve as basis for the settlement of the disputes which may arise between them, agreed to enter into a treaty covering these points.

Article I. The contracting parties recognize and guarantee to each other, as a basis of their international public law the following principles:

1. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of the respective Republics.

2. The strictest neutrality in the questions or differences which may occur between two or more of the contracting republics. Notwithstanding this, if any of these republics shall permit, encourage, or protect the organization of factions within its territory, or shall invade another state, causing a "de facto" rupture, then the neutral republics shall make common cause and shall constitute themselves into a defensive alliance with the offended or invaded, until they shall obtain the reestablishment of peace; and

3. Arbitration as a sole method of settling or solving all questions or differences which may arise between the signatory Republics whatever their cause, nature, or object may be.

Article II. For the safeguard and application of these fundamental principles a periodical diet is established, composed of five plenipotentiaries, one being named by each of the governments of Central America. This diet shall be called the "Central American Diet," and it shall hold its inaugural session January 1, 1893. . . . The meetings of the Central American Diet shall take place in turn each year in capitals of contracting republics.

Article III. Central American Diet has the following functions:

1. To offer its pacific mediation when there is danger of any disagreement between the contracting republics.

2. To settle as arbitrators, questions which may be submitted to it, if pacific mediation shall not suffice to end the dispute.

Article IV. The functions were:

1. To draw up all the treaties involving private international law in criminal, civil, commercial, and judicial matters.

2. To draw up treaties for the Central American customs, monetary, postal, and telegraphic union. Methods of procedure are indicated in the articles.

Article X. The present treaty shall be submitted to the government of Costa Rica for its adhesion.

Article XI. It is not indispensable to the validity of this treaty that it be formally ratified by all the republics which sign it.²²⁸

²²⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1894, pp. 437, 438.

The treaty would seem to have been of little value for the purposes for which it was designed. In 1893, the Honduran foreign office bitterly complained against the administration of Nicaragua to the governments of Guatemala, Salvador, and Costa Rica. The accusation was made that Nicaragua was aiding the Honduran refugees in that country in their efforts to initiate a new revolution against the government of Vasquez in Honduras. The outcome was war, which was over in March, 1894. Vasquez was overthrown and the authority of Doctor Policarpo Bonilla established over all Honduran territory.²²⁹

Nearly ten years had passed since Barrios had offered himself as a self-appointed leader of Central American Federation. It was a decade of ceaseless activity and striving for the rebirth of Central American nationality, but the revolutionary habit was too strong. The good intentions of succeeding congresses were nullified by the persistency with which the states strove with each other. A United States diplomat declared that the lack of quick communication constituted the chief obstacle to the federal union of the Central American States. With real understanding of the situation, he added,

But a single agency—the protectorate of a powerful country—can make such a union possible in Central America.²³⁰

CHAPTER VII

THE GREATER REPUBLIC OF CENTRAL AMERICA, 1895–1898

A far more promising attempt to attain Federation was made in 1895. Indeed the ideal was actually though imperfectly realized for a time.

On June 20, 1895, the three states, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador, which had always been most loyal to the Federal idea, actually accomplished a partial union. The new republic was called by the Treaty of Amapala, “La Republic Mayor de Centro-America.” Ratifications were

²²⁹ *For. Rel.*, 1894, pp. 441, 445.

²³⁰ Logan in *For. Rel.*, 1887, p. 105.

exchanged September 15, 1895, and a single political organization for the exercise of their external sovereignty was formed.²³¹ The first three articles of the treaty of Federation reveal the spirit of union embodying itself in a tangible form:

Article I. The republics of Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras shall hereafter form a single political entity for the exercise of the sovereignty as regards their intercourse with foreign nations, to be known as the Greater Republic of Central America. This name shall continue in use until the republics of Guatemala and Costa Rica shall voluntarily accept the present treaty, in which case it shall be called the "Republic of Central America."

Article II. The signatory governments do not by the present treaty, renounce their autonomy and independence as regards the direction of their internal affairs, and the constitution and laws of each state shall remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the stipulation hereof.

Article III. For the execution of the provisions contained in Article I, there shall be a diet, composed of one member and one substitute, elected by each of the Congresses of the signatory republics for a term of three years.²³²

Constituted under this treaty, the Confederation could have but a precarious existence. It did not rest on a constitution, and the scheme of government provided was very imperfect.

It was nothing more than

an association whereby certain representative functions were delegated to a tripartite commission, rather than a federation possessing centralized powers of government and administration.²³³

This commission or "Dieta" of the Greater Republic of Central America as it was designated, sent the following, communicated to

His Excellency, the President of the United States: Great and good Friend: The republics of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador, by a treaty concluded in the port of Amapala, Honduras on the twentieth day of June, 1895, which was ratified by the respective legislative bodies of the three republics, and the ratifications of which were exchanged in this city on the fifteenth instant, agreed to form a single political organization for the exercise of

²³¹ Moore, *Digest*, v. 1, p. 145. Rey, p. 6.

²³² *For. Rel.*, 1896, pp. 391-392.

²³³ McKinley in *Mess. and Papers of the President*, v. 10, p. 100.

their external sovereignty with the title of the Greater Republic of Central America, to be represented by a Deit composed of three members elected by each of the legislative bodies.²³⁴

This message found a very favorable reception in the United States. Don José Dolores Rodriquez, appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Government at Washington, was recognized by the President with the distinct understanding, however,

that the responsibilities of each of those republics to the United States of America remain wholly unaffected.²³⁵

In his reply to the ambassador at his reception, the President said,

I discern in the articles of association from which the Diet derives its powers, a step toward a closer union of Central American States in the interest of their common defence and general welfare, and I welcome it as the precursor of other steps to be taken in the same direction, and what is hoped may eventually result in a consolidation of all the States of Central America as one nation for all the purposes of their foreign relations and intercourse.²³⁶

The United States Senate did not share altogether the confidence of President Cleveland in the Greater Republic of Central America. Indeed it was regarded with suspicion, the fear being expressed that the three states in subjecting their foreign relations and not their internal affairs to the Diet were seeking in some way to evade certain international obligations of a financial nature. Although Minister Rodriquez received recognition by the President when he presented his credentials on December 24, 1896, no change was made by Congress in the diplomatic appropriation bill to provide a minister for the new republic, although it was apparent that no envoy from the United States could be received by either of the three republics, because each had surrendered to the Diet its right to receive and send ministers.²³⁷

²³⁴ Dated at San Salvador, September 19, 1896. See *For. Rel.*, 1896, p. 367.

²³⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1896, pp. 368, 370.

²³⁶ *For. Rel.*, 1896, p. 320.

²³⁷ *R. of R. (N. Y.)*, v. 20, 1899, p. 445.

The text of the treaty of Amapala was sent to Costa Rica and Guatemala, and their adherence invited. For a time they held entirely aloof, but a treaty of June 15, 1897, supplementary to that of June 20, 1895, provided for the acceptance by Guatemala and Costa Rica in which case the republic should be called the "Republic of Central America." In the supplementary treaty it is stated in Article I, that the governments of Guatemala and Costa Rica and the Greater Republic of Central America "shall henceforth form a free and independent nation."

The executive council was to call a national assembly within five years, or sooner if possible, to frame the permanent Constitution of the Republic of Central America, and "said term may be extended at the discretion of the council."²³⁸

The treaty was never ratified, and Guatemala and Costa Rica never became actual members of the Greater Republic.

In 1898, the Confederation was put on a better basis. A definitive constitution was adopted by a constituent assembly meeting at Managua, August 27, 1898, and the steps taken forecast in the original compact. By the constitution a Federal Republic was established under the name, "Estados Unidos de Centro-America." The constitution was not to be submitted to popular vote, but a commission was appointed to exercise the functions of government for a time, and to provide for the election of a President during the following December. It was expected that the President would be inaugurated in March, 1899.²³⁹

The Executive Federal Council was installed at Amapala, November 1, 1898, and put into force the political constitution of the United States of Central America.²⁴⁰ This provisional council was to last until a president should be elected by the people.

It was reported that this birth of a national life was the result of a spontaneous assembling of the governments of the states of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador. Public

²³⁸ *Consular Reports*, 1897, v. 55, pp. 285-287.

²³⁹ *Consular Reports*, 1898, v. 58, p. 601. Rey, p. 6. Sears, p. 499.

²⁴⁰ *M. and P. of the Pres.*, v. 10, p. 101. Moore, *Digest*, v. 1, p. 145.

opinion, frankly manifested through the organs of the press, assisted and a majority of the political clubs were heartily working for the union. At the time

it seemed as if the work of national union, so longed for by Central American patriotism, was consolidated, presenting in the lap of peace, the fruit of order and of liberty.²⁴¹

The federation failed within a month of its inauguration. Revolutionary movements arose, demanding unity of action on the part of the military power of the Federal States to suppress them. It was the test of the Federation. The new union weakened under the strain, and utterly collapsed.

About the middle of November, General Tomaso Regalado was one of the candidates for the presidency of Salvador. By gaining control of the army, he succeeded in fomenting a separatist movement in the state of Salvador. Proclaiming himself Dictator, he demanded to be recognized as President. The people of Salvador were forced to submit to his will. After gaining control of affairs, Regalado issued a proclamation declaring that Salvador was no longer a member of the Confederation; but that it was ready to join the Union of Central American Republics whenever its own interests made such a course advisable. There is a suggestion of dissatisfaction in Salvador over the financial arrangements provided by the new federal constitution. However that may be, the council had complied with the mandate of the law and had attempted to carry out the organization of the new government in justice to the states composing it.²⁴²

The pact of union evidently had not obtained the sanction of the Salvadorean people, who regarded it as a violation of the political constitution of Salvador. They contended that the deputies to the constituent assembly at Managua, were not directly elected by the people of Salvador, and for that reason had no legal authority to agree to a constitutional law that could bind the republic. Under

²⁴¹ *For. Rel.*, 1898, p. 175, Sanson to Merry.

²⁴² *For. Rel.*, 1898, p. 175.

the terms of the union, it was felt that the interests of Salvador would suffer; hence the following decree of divorce:

Article I. The republic of Salvador is not obliged, by the contract of Amapala, to acknowledge any authority in the Constitution of Managua of August 27, of the current year, and it is released from the contract of union with the republics of Honduras and Nicaragua.

Article II. The republic of Salvador assumes in full its self-government and independence, and will enter into the union with the sister republics of Central America when the same is convenient to its positive interests and is the express and free will of the Salvadorean people.²⁴³

The Executive Federal Council tried to suffocate the rebellion, but was obliged to recognize its impotence to execute the pact of union. Many military commanders in the service of the Federation failed in their duty so that the prompt and timely action of the council was weakened. The state of Salvador remained separated from the republic, and under painful necessity the council declared the union at an end, November 29, 1898, twenty-eight days after its inauguration. Nicaragua and Honduras soon abandoned the joint compact, each resuming its independent sovereignty.²⁴⁴

The history of this effort to federate Central America reveals the same evil influences at work as formerly, to prevent the consummation so earnestly desired by Central America, so urgently needed by the other nations of the world. The Constitution conveys the impression that the states were decidedly selfish. Real union could only endure as each state sacrificed something to the common government, and this is what the states were unwilling to do. It is doubtful if the United States of Central America could have continued long if Salvador had not seceded. The states seem to want Federation but do not want it enough to pay the price. When tempted to criticise their attitude in this respect, we must remember the feeling in

²⁴³ *For. Rel.*, 1898, p. 174. Dated, November 25, 1898, and signed T. Regalado, General of Div. and Prov. Pres. of Republic of Salvador.

²⁴⁴ *Rey*, p. 6. *For. Rel.*, 1898, pp. 175f. *Moore, Digest*, v. 1, p. 145. *M. and P. of Pres.*, v. 10, p. 140.

the Thirteen States during the critical period before the adoption of the Federal Constitution.

The nineteenth century was not to close until another effort had resulted in failure. Regalado was not opposed to union. On the contrary, after the United States of Central America had been destroyed through his effort, he was very much in favor of Federation. He was far-sighted enough to see that the largest state, Guatemala, must be included or else serve as a pretext for new revolutions and wars, which he knew by successful experience would overthrow a federal state. Regalado sought to be on good terms with the government and people of Guatemala, that he might count on their coöperation. Don Pedro José Escalon was sent to Guatemala as confidential agent together with Dr. Don Francisco A. Reyes as minister plenipotentiary. They initiated a political, peaceful propaganda, as the fundamental base for the development of the union project. Unfortunately, the Guatemalan emigrés, led by General José Leon Castillo, despising the counsels of Regalado, penetrated in considerable numbers into Guatemalan territory at the end of 1899 with the sole object of putting difficulties in the way of Escalon and Reyes.²⁴⁵ The important mission to the government of Estuda Cabrera in Guatemala was made impossible of fulfillment, but negotiations with Costa Rica were more fruitful. A secret alliance between Iglesias, President of Costa Rica, and Regalado, was agreed upon in November, 1899, at Carthage. This pact was the principal basis of the development of the combination which it was hoped would result in Central American unification.

The diplomacy connected with the intrigues of Regalado is decidedly complex. There is sufficient evidence that he was depending upon the help of Mexico. In 1900, Zaldivar who had not ceased his efforts for Federation with his failure in 1885, acted as the agent of Regalado in Mexico, where a secret pact was made March 2, whereby the attention of the Guatemalan army was to be divided, making the vic-

²⁴⁵ Leon, p. 103.

tory of the revolutionists easy.²⁴⁶ The correspondence shows clearly enough the attitude of President Diaz toward the movement for union.

Zaldivar wrote to Regalado from Mexico, April 18, 1900,

Diaz believes that only the policy of union would give beneficial results for the peace of Central America, and desires that the other governments be inspired with the same ideas.²⁴⁷

In a letter dated April 27, 1900, Zaldivar speaks of the military school founded in San Salvador, and quotes Diaz as saying that it was worthy of its object, and "the capital of the future republic of Central America."²⁴⁸ Zaldivar continued to take an interest in the movement after removing to New York. In May, 1900, he pleaded with Regalado to exercise great reserve in the treatment of the subject of such great importance.²⁴⁹

On the 3d of August, Regalado wrote to President Diaz of Mexico in regard to his plans. He realized the necessity of establishing the superiority of Salvador among the people of the isthmus. His proposition involved the training and instruction of a Salvadorean army sufficient to secure that superiority.²⁵⁰

The climax came during the closing months of 1902. On November 21, Riviera wrote to Regalado that the conditions in Salvador were favorable for the unionist enterprise. The government of Honduras favored the restoration of the "Mando," February 1, 1903, and would not refuse taking part in an undertaking which was in accord with its political creed. Nicaragua was menaced by revolution and external war, and Guatemala which constituted the greatest obstacle to union, was "abased below all conception." On the other hand, the Salvadorean army was powerfully organized and well-equipped, and Riviera concludes,

²⁴⁶ Leon, p. 104.

²⁴⁷ Riviera, R., *Apuntes Historicos sobre union Centro Americana*. Quoted by Leon, p. 86.

²⁴⁸ Leon, p. 88.

²⁴⁹ Leon, p. 89.

²⁵⁰ Leon, p. 92.

other internal and external circumstances which I omit, and which are known to you, make of these moments, the most favorable for the unionist enterprise.²⁵¹

The movement never materialized. The time was not sufficient for the hatching of the plot. The elections were held in Salvador in 1903, and Regalado was ineligible for reëlection.

CHAPTER VIII

CONFERENCES AND TREATIES, 1902-1907

Since the tragic defeat of Barrios in 1885, it has become increasingly evident that the Federation of Central America cannot be accomplished through the selfish ambition of a self-appointed leader. The friends of the unionist cause have become convinced that a republic founded on force could not endure the conflicts of individual state interests. If the vision of Central American patriots which has survived for nearly a century is to be realized, it must be by the exercise of skillful diplomacy. The twentieth century has been marked by a series of diplomatic efforts in this direction. The treaties and conventions of the period indicate the flood-tide of union sentiment. Far more important than any direct effort is the educational value of Central American intercourse during the past fifteen years. A survey of these favorable years may convince us that a federation of Central America is impossible without the help of a strong nation to counsel and protect, or a foreign war.

A treaty of peace and compulsory arbitration was adopted by four states (Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador) at Corinto, on January 20, 1902. A central American who was present states that it was adopted "under the influence of the memories of the glorious period of the federation" of the early years of the nineteenth century.²⁵² President Iglesias of Guatemala agreed to sign the treaty and requested that a copy be sent to him. The preamble says:

²⁵¹ Leon, p. 93.

²⁵² Rey, p. 6. *For. Rel.*, 1902, pp. 881f.

The governments of Nicaragua, Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, desirous of contributing by all the means in their power to the maintenance of the peace and good harmony that exists and should exist among them, have agreed to celebrate a convention of peace and obligatory arbitration. . . .

Nothing is said of union, for statesmen had learned that peace must first be assured. Deeper thoughts than those which find expression in the instrument are suggested by Article XVII:

For the installation of the Arbitration Tribunal established by this agreement, the fifteenth of September of the current year, the anniversary of the independence of Central America is named.

The arbitration court, created by this treaty is of considerable interest. After reiterating the thought that the sole object is the maintenance and assurance of the peace of Central America, Article II, says,

The contracting parties establish the principle of obligatory arbitration in order to adjust every difficulty or question that might present itself between the contracting parties, binding themselves in consequence to submit them to a tribunal of Central American arbitrators.

The plans for this court are carefully thought out and set forth in the treaty.²⁵³

If a treaty could have maintained peace in Central America, this convention, eventually signed by all of the states, would seem to have furnished the necessary machinery. It does not strike the student of Latin American history and affairs as remarkable, that the President of Salvador, the next year after the signing of this treaty should ignore it, and invite the governments of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua to hold an international conference with the object of assuring peace and harmony between the Central American republics. When we read the stipulations of the resulting agreement, which was entered into November 2, 1903, we are convinced of a persistent determination to bring peace to Central America, and prepare the way for federation.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ *For. Rel.*, pp. 882, 883.

²⁵⁴ Leon, p. 85, Riviera writes of a convention between various Central American governments for the purpose of proclaiming a federation, February or March, 1903. The principle cause of failure was the political situation of Honduras.

First. The governments of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador take upon themselves the obligation to maintain peace between the republics here represented. Consequently, as an inviolable principle of conduct, they establish the non-intervention of any one of them in the domestic affairs of the other sister republics.

Second. The cultivation of good relations being one of the most efficacious means of maintaining peace, the four governments promise themselves to reciprocally accredit consuls-general with the character of charge d'affaires, with their residence in the capitals of each of the republics.

Third. To adjust disputes that may arise between the signatory nations, the principle of obligatory arbitration already recognized is hereby confirmed.

Fourth. The problems that arise between any of the signatory republics, which are not bound between themselves by former conventions of arbitration, shall be settled in accordance with the principles and regulations set forth in the Pan-American treaty entered into at Mexico, in January, 1902.

Fifth. In case of a serious difficulty between two or more of the signatory republics, that makes armed strife probable, the parties interested obligate themselves to ask for, and the neutrals to interpose their friendly mediation for the peaceful adjustment of the pending difficulties.

Sixth. This treaty being of general interest to Central America, and the sister republic of Costa Rica not being represented in this conference, it is decided to invite Costa Rica in order that, if she deems it convenient, she may accept and sign the stipulations set forth herein.²⁵⁵

The following year a third conference was held, ostensibly for the purpose of securing the peace of Central America. Representatives from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Honduras met at Corinto, August 21, 1904. A manifesto was subscribed to, which began as follows:

To maintain peace is the principle objective of our governments, not only because it is a necessity for the various peoples, but also because it imposes itself as a duty which all Spanish American nationalities should fulfill. For this reason, we firmly believe in the proposition to overcome in Central America every obstacle that may stand in the way of peace, and we will put forth our strongest efforts to frustrate the schemes of those who seek to sow distrust and jealousy among us, impelled as they are by the spirit of ambition or disorder, etc.²⁵⁶

The declaration was a lengthy one. It virtually formed a league to enforce peace, as the four governments were

²⁵⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1904, p. 351.

²⁵⁶ Pepper, *Guatemala*, p. 68. *For. Rel.*, 1904, p. 541.

determined to aid each other by military force if necessary in maintaining the status quo. It was hoped the peace of Central America was assured by making revolutionary efforts more difficult to start and less likely to achieve success.

In July, 1906, a serious war developed, although the United States Minister tried to prevent it. Guatemala invaded Honduras and Salvador. The latter republic was anxious for peace, but the war spirit was strong in Guatemala.

President Roosevelt urged peace in communications to President Escalon of Salvador, and President Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala, and in this attempt the President of Mexico coöperated with the United States. Costa Rica desired to offer its good offices conjointly with the United States, but its desires seem to have been ignored.

Salvador accepted without reservation President Roosevelt's offer of the naval-ship *Marblehead* as a place of meeting of commissioners from Salvador and Guatemala. The latter state also accepted the invitation, but required assurances of good faith from Salvador. Honduras, it must be remembered, was in alliance with Salvador.

The Peace Conference was held July 20, 1906. Costa Rica and Nicaragua were represented, although their delegates were without votes or influence; their representation was entirely complimentary. The ministers of the United States were also present in an advisory capacity. In the treaty of peace, which was drawn up, it was agreed that all international stipulations binding the contracting parties should remain in force, specially those of the second Pan-American Conference, assembled at Mexico. By the terms of Article IV,

within two months from date the contracting parties shall celebrate a general treaty of peace, amity, and navigation, and the capital of the republic of Costa Rica is hereby designated for the meeting of the representatives of the three governments fully authorized for their negotiations.

Acting on this suggestion, the government of Costa Rica invited the three contracting parties and the government of

Nicaragua to send delegates to San José. Nicaragua at first refused to accept the invitation, the ground of the refusal being well-taken, as it was felt that the arrangements of the treaty signed at Corinto, January 20, 1902, were sufficient and still in force.²⁵⁷ Costa Rica had extended the invitation, however, with the main intent of giving special significance to the anniversary of Central American independence, for the meeting was to be held September 15. Nicaragua after this explanation accepted their invitation, but subsequently withdrew on the ground that she was not one of the belligerents. It was then represented to Nicaragua that it was not necessary for Nicaragua and Costa Rica to become parties to the treaty, but that the representation of all the republics on such an anniversary would lead to better acquaintance and tend toward the peace of Central America. To this plea Nicaragua sent no reply.

The treaty was signed September 25, 1906, by representatives of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador.²⁵⁸ A stipulation was inserted providing for a bureau to be located in the city of Guatemala, for the purpose of fostering intercourse between the republics; another article created a pedagogical institute of Central America.²⁵⁹

The mystery of Nicaragua's vacillation and obstinacy is soon solved. On January 9, 1907, that republic let it be known that it refused to be bound by the terms of the "Treaty of Marblehead." The President of Honduras found it necessary to order troops near the Nicaraguan frontier to suppress revolutionary movements directed against his government; these he believed were aided by President Zelaya of Nicaragua. The Hondurean troops finally invaded Nicaragua, on the ground that in order to suppress the revolutionists who sought refuge in Nicaragua, it was necessary to cross the boundary. Nicaragua claimed indemnity for the violation of her territory. The claim was

²⁵⁷ *For. Rel.*, 1906, pt. 1, pp. 834-855. Brown, *Am. J. Inter'l Law*, Jan. 1908, p. 126.

²⁵⁸ *Consular Reports*, Dec. 1906, No. 315, p. 102.

²⁵⁹ *Rey*, p. 6.

referred to an arbitration board composed of one member from each of the republics of Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador.²⁶⁰ It should be noted that this meeting, which convened February 15, was suggested and held in conformity to the Treaty of Corinto, which was thus not altogether without practical results. The board dissolved, unfortunately, because both sides insisted on continuing their war-like preparations. Zelaya had insisted on reparation as the basis of arbitration.

On February 19, 1907, hostilities broke out afresh. Thereupon President Diaz of Mexico sent a message to the Presidents of Honduras and Nicaragua stating that following the initiative of the United States, he had written to Costa Rica, Salvador, and Guatemala, asking them to join in a request to Honduras and Nicaragua that the session of the Arbitration Tribunal be resumed at San Salvador.²⁶¹ During March, Tegucigalpa was occupied by revolutionists and Nicaraguan forces. In April peace was declared. When war was again imminent in August, President Roosevelt addressed identical messages to the five republics, pleading for peace. President Diaz did likewise after conferring with the United States.²⁶² On September 17, representatives of the five republics signed a protocol convening a conference at Washington.

CHAPTER IX

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE CONFERENCES, 1907-1915

The five Central American States accepted Mr. Blaine's invitations to a Pan-American Congress in 1882. Costa Rica expressed "enthusiasm upon the subject." Guatemala expressed great regret that a project of such vital importance to the Central American States should have failed even temporarily, and hoped it would be revived at no distant day.²⁶³

El Guatemalteco of February 18, 1882, said,

²⁶⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 607, 613.

²⁶¹ *For. Rel.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 624.

²⁶² *For. Rel.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 638.

²⁶³ Blaine, *Pol. Discussions*, p. 406.

It becomes necessary to confess that the undertaking is of such magnitude, that it has not yet had a champion who, under all circumstances, might be able to sustain it, without bending under its weight. Today it is the great colossus of the American Continent, which takes upon itself the realization of that brilliant and philanthropic thought. Guatemala felicitates itself that to the United States belongs the glory of acquiring so splendid a conquest.²⁶⁴

Blaine had a very keen desire to see the Central American Federation a reality, and developed his thought in his instructions to Minister Logan in 1880. He said:

You cannot impress too strongly upon the government to which you are accredited or upon the public men with whom you associate, the importance which the government of the United States attaches to such a confederation of the States of Central America as will respond to the wants and wishes of their people. The population of the Central American States taken together equals 3,000,000 (1881) and is nearly if not quite as great as the population of the Thirteen Colonies at the time of the revolution against the British government, 1776. The growth, prosperity, and power of this country, since that period has been almost entirely due to a union of the states such as is now warmly commended to Central America. Our popular maxim, that "In union there is strength," finds its counterpart in the equally manifest truth that "In division there is weakness." So long as the Central American States remain divided, they will fail to acquire the strength and prestige to which they are entitled.

The minister was warned to be on close watch for evidence of any attempt on the part of any European power to acquire territory in Central America, and on August 3, 1880, Logan was authorized to visit the capitals of the several Central American States to ascertain and report the condition of the public feeling on the subject of confederation.²⁶⁵

When the Pan-American Conference was actually held in 1890 the Central American republics were represented, and through the medium of the successive conferences held, have derived great benefit; but evidently Pan-Americanism alone could not be trusted to bring peace and progress to even Central America.

²⁶⁴ *For. Rel.*, 1882, p. 33.

²⁶⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1881, pp. 102, 103.

Secretary of State, Elihu Root, during the summer of 1907, recognized that something must be done for Central America. He induced the Presidents of the United States and Mexico to secure an adjustment of the disputes pending between the republics of the Isthmus.

The protocol convening a conference was signed at Washington, September 17, 1907, by representatives of the five republics; Mexico and the United States were invited to participate in a friendly capacity. For many months strained relations had existed between several of the states, but a good spirit was manifested by the delegates. According to the protocol two things were to be done by the conference. It was first,

for the purpose of adjusting any differences which exist between the said republics or between any of them; secondly, it was for the purpose of concluding a treaty which should define their general relations.²⁶⁶

The conference promised to be a failure in view of the distracted state of the countries involved. Had it not been for the action of three of the republics, nothing could have saved the proposed conference from disaster. The date set for the first meeting at Washington was November 13. On November 6, at Amapala, Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua agreed to consider all the differences among the three governments at an end;²⁶⁷ they also agreed to invite the adherence of Costa Rica and Guatemala to the agreement already adopted, and to entreat them to join in the labor for the cause of the Central American people so closely bound together by their common origin and interests. Provision was made at the same time for following up the Washington Conference.

In order further to strengthen the whole covenant, it is agreed to hold a Central American peace congress, consisting of a representative from each one of the republics of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Salvador, and Guatemala, which shall take place at this port of Amapala immediately after the Washington conferences, or later if it shall be so decided, at which meeting there shall be also concluded new treaties of peace, amity, and a com-

²⁶⁶ Buchanan, *Report C. Am. Peace Conf.*, p. 6.

²⁶⁷ *For. Rel.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 660.

merce, which shall condense and amplify the former treaties and thus unify the international law of Central America.²⁶⁸

The Conference at Washington convened on November 13, 1907. On the reading of the protocol, the question of claims then pending between the republics as the result of armed disturbances that had existed for months, naturally arose. A delegate from Salvador showed the way to a free discussion of the questions they had assembled to consider. Rising to his feet, he stated that his country had no claim of any kind to present against either of the other four republics. The chairmen of the delegations of the remaining states followed with similar declarations. The first object of the gathering was thus happily disposed of.

At the second session projects were presented covering the general relations of the republics as provided in the last part of Article I of the protocol. The Honduran delegation presented a scheme for the union of the five republics. This measure was strongly advocated by all of the delegates from Honduras, since it seemed to them to be the only solution for the constantly recurring disputes that had retarded the development of Central America. Their memorandum submitted recites that,

Every Central American agrees that the union is the absolute destiny of these countries, and that some day it will be realized; opinions differ only with regard to the opportune moment to bring this about. This opportunity we see in the present conference which appears to us to be the most propitious that has occurred in the course of our national lives. The circumstances could not be improved on. The friendly intervention of the United States and Mexico constituted a powerful moral force. No claims or differences were existing between the republics. The Presidents of Nicaragua and Honduras were willing to resign, thus pointing the way. If the other Presidents did not, the consolidation would only be delayed until their terms of office were up, when they delivered back to the people the power they had received.²⁶⁹

Certain bases of union were proposed:

²⁶⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 663. Signed by Miguel R. Davila, President of Honduras; J. S. Zelaya, President of Nicaragua, F. Figueroa, President of Salvador.

²⁶⁹ Buchanan, pp. 7, 8.

The respective congresses to ratify within three months the treaties signed at this conference, and to then convoke a constitutional convention which will frame the fundamental law of the republic, and organize judicial powers for its execution without prejudice to the disposition relative to the election of the legislative and executive bodies in the future.

The Nicaraguan delegation also favored this plan of union. The delegates from Salvador inclined to it in principle, but the delegates from Guatemala opposed it. The Costa Rican delegation objected to the consideration of the matter, taking the position that the project was entirely out of order under the terms of the protocol convening the conference.

A memorandum presented by Guatemala proposed merely the celebration of a treaty of friendship and peace modelled after the treaty of San José of September 25, 1906, with such modifications as were thought necessary to insure good relations between the Central American states in the future.²⁷⁰

Both projects were referred for study and report to a special committee, consisting of representatives from each of the five delegations. At the next session the committee submitted two reports; one strongly favored the Honduran plan and was signed by the delegates from Honduras and Nicaragua; the other, signed by the delegates representing Guatemala, Salvador, and Costa Rica, strongly opposed the project and favored the course proposed by Guatemala.

The cardinal points in the case as stated by the minority report were:

First. That union will alone insure stable and efficient peace and order in Central America.

Second. That an existing and constant sentiment of unity and a consciousness of a common destiny are essential characteristics of our political life.

Third. That obstacles to union do not originate with the people, nor are they insurmountable.

Fourth. That the Conference should conclude a convention covering the project submitted by the Honduras delegation and leave the solution of the matter to the legislative members of the republics.

²⁷⁰ Buchanan, p. 8.

Fifth. That inasmuch as a convention providing for union might not be ratified by a sufficient number of the states, it would be advisable for the Conference to conclude at the same time a treaty of friendship, peace, arbitration, etc., with the necessary provision for its development and application, as proposed by the Guatemala delegation, and that the question of what steps could be taken to guarantee the carrying out of this treaty should be discussed so that the fate that had befallen many other Central American treaties might not overtake this one.²⁷¹

The majority of the committee in their report stated:

They consider the political union of Central America as the greatest and noblest aspiration of patriotism, though they think that the conditions of Central America at the moment, are not propitious to decree national reconstruction, which, in order that it may be durable and solid, requires that their economic, moral, political, and material elements shall have been harmonized.

They do not think therefore that it is opportune to discuss in the present conference a project for the immediate establishment of a union, but solely these measures which will tend toward preparing in a stable manner for this union, strengthening their means of communication, establishing a coasting ship commerce, linking together the economic and social interests of the people of the republics, unifying their customs and tax laws, and encouraging the frequent meeting of Central American conferences. The most prosperous development of the people of the republics, and a definite union, both have their root in the uniform extension of their separate economic elements, which creating great material interests, will certainly form an indissoluble link between the republics. When the iron rail destroys distances that now practically separate the rich lands of the republics, and develop their wealth through the exchange of their products, their people will, through this evolution, reach their aspirations and bridge their necessities.

To them we might confide the realization of the ideal of uniting the five sections of the old Patria, without that precipitancy which might compromise its success. It is not wise to think of passing rapidly to a sincere and pacific union. The steps taken here toward making peace certain in Central America, toward guaranteeing security for capital and labor, toward improving their elements of production, their social interests, and their initiative in self-government, will contribute in no small part toward this end. The pedagogical institute to be created in Costa Rica will also contribute to this end as an element of fraternity and a propaganda of the principles of justice, of order, and of union, while the creation of the Central American Bureau, agreed upon at San José, will be of transcendental importance.

²⁷¹ Buchanan, p. 10.

In the matter of adopting the treaty of San José as a basis for discussion, as proposed by the Guatemalan delegation, the plan should be adopted. First of all a committee should be designated to formulate a project for an obligatory arbitration treaty, upon bases that will establish a permanent court of international justice for Central America.²⁷²

The reading of these reports introduced an element of discord into the Conference. Some of the delegations insisted strenuously that the subject matter of the reports should not be discussed. The representatives of United States and Mexico suggested that the consideration of both reports be postponed, and that the Conference proceed to prepare the projects for several important conventions. This proposal relieved the tension, and as the Conference progressed the question of union became less acute. The final disposition of the issue, which was satisfactory to all, was the inclusion in the minutes of the Conference of a written statement of their views presented by Doctor Bonilla, Doctor Madrez, and Senor Fiallos representatives of Nicaragua and Honduras.²⁷³ The key note of these arguments for union is the need for a united government to cure the revolutionary habit fostered by the existence of five independent states.

The following treaties and conventions were concluded between the five republics.

1. A general treaty of peace and amity.
2. A convention additional to the general treaty of peace and amity.
3. A convention for the establishment of a Central American court of justice.
4. A protocol additional to the convention for the establishment of a Central American court of Justice.
5. An extradition convention.
6. A convention for the establishment of an international Central American bureau.
7. A convention for the establishment of a Central American pedagogical institute.

²⁷² Buchanan, pp. 10, 11.

²⁷³ These statements are too lengthy to be quoted here. They are found in full in Buchanan's *Report of the Conference*, pp. 90, 97.

8. A convention concerning future Central American conferences.

9. A convention concerning railway communications.

The general treaty of peace and amity represents the chief work of the Conference. The principle features of the treaty are:

1. Its absolutely obligatory character for ten years.

2. The declaration that any disposition or measure tending to alter the organization of either of the republics shall be deemed a menace to the peace of all.

3. The clause making the territory of Honduras neutral in event of any conflict between the other republics, so long as Honduras remains neutral.²⁷⁴

4. The mutual recognition of all Central Americans as citizens.

5. The provisions by which political refugees and disturbers are not to be allowed to reside near the frontier of any of the five republics.

6. The obligations by which each republic binds itself not to recognize in another a government resulting from a coup d'état, nor to intervene in favor of or against the existing government of another republic in cases of disorder therein.

7. The agreement to use their efforts to secure constitutional reforms that would prohibit the election of a president for a second term.²⁷⁵

At the time of the Conference, the Central American Court of Justice was regarded as the most signal achievement. Prof. P. M. Brown formerly United States Minister to Honduras wrote of it in a congratulatory vein,

To the powers of Europe, the great powers of the world, who struggled with partial success for four months at the Hague, to establish a court of arbitral justice, the young republics of Central America may recall the scriptural phrase, "A little child shall lead them."²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Honduras had been most often the theatre of Central American conflicts owing to its geographical position.

²⁷⁵ For conventions, see *ibid.*, pp. 31-55.

²⁷⁶ Brown, P. M., *Am. J. Inter'l Law*, Jan., 1908, p. 143.

Mr. Andrew Carnegie at the laying of the corner stone of the new building of the Pan-American Union in 1908, said of the Central American Court of Justice,

Perhaps this is the most encouraging step forward that has yet been taken, for it promises to lead to the union of these five nations, following the example of our own republic, converting a number of separate states into one nation with international peace secured.²⁷⁷

The Costa Rican Minister for Foreign Affairs, Luis Anderson, said at the inauguration of the Court of Justice,

It is a glorious thing for Central America to have purified its past errors by throwing to the winds today this new banner. We must never forget that there is incarnate in this Court of Justice for Central America the spirit of old Patria; that Central America is united through the personality of its members, who have received their commissions from the representatives of the people of Central America and who thus form one body in which the souls of the old nationality is to be developed so that it may become the first step toward the union which all of us desire to see arise solidly and vigorously by virtue of peace and of the forces of work.²⁷⁸

Enrique C. Creel, high commissioner representing Mexico said,

The Court of Justice for Central America is neither an occurrence of the moment nor without antecedents. It is in the new world the seed sown by Simon Bolivar, which by a happy coincidence, springs forth in these moments in which the plow of civilization breaks the earth where it was deposited in order that nations may be united for the good of humanity, and with beneficent effect upon the peace of the entire world.²⁷⁹

Zelaya's government in Nicaragua decreed May 25 as a holiday as an evidence of rejoicing for such a happy occurrence.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Barrett, *Pan. Am. Union*, p. 211.

²⁷⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1908, p. 225.

²⁷⁹ *For. Rel.*, 1908, p. 227. The principle of international arbitration had been considered by Bolivar in the treaty between the republic of Colombia, the republic of Central America, Mexico, and Peru, and had been adopted at the Congress of Panama in 1826. It was not ratified by the other republics.

²⁸⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1908, p. 239.

This court was declared to represent the national conscience of Central America, representing something absolutely unique in the history of international relation. It marked a new epoch in civilization.²⁸¹

Mr. Buchanan realized the weakness of this glorified institution. In his report of the Washington Conference, he said,

The creation of this court does not solve one important question affecting the peace of these republics, namely, how to avoid internal outbreaks against existing authority in the republics signatory to the Convention of Washington.²⁸²

The Convention providing for the court declares,

The Central American republics consider the maintenance of peace among themselves as their primordial duty, and obligate themselves to forever observe the most complete harmony and to settle every disagreement or difficulty of what nature soever it may be, which may arise between them by means of the Central American Court of Justice.

Additional jurisdiction was granted in the following cases:

a. In questions which individuals of one Central American country may raise against any of the other contracting governments because of the violation of treaty conventions, and other cases of international character.

b. In cases which by common accord the contracting governments may submit to it, no matter whether they arise between two or more of them or between one of said governments and individuals.

c. In international questions which by special agreement by one of the Central American governments and a foreign government may have determined to submit to it.²⁸³

The court is granted jurisdiction over all controversies of whatever nature and no exception is made of matters

²⁸¹ Wheelless, Jos. M., in *Proceedings 4th Nat'l Conf. of Am. Soc. for Judicial Settlement of Inter'l Disputes*, p. 65. Wheelless, Pan. Am. Bull. no. 39, p. 925.

²⁸² *For. Rel.*, 1909, p. 246.

²⁸³ Penfield, W. S., in *Proceedings 4th Nat'l Conf., Am. Soc. Jud. Settlement*, etc., p. 179.

affecting national independence and honor. In giving jurisdiction to settle controversies between the individuals of one state and one of the parties to the convention, they evidently had in mind the early formation of a Central American Union.

The court was solemnly installed in Cartago, Costa Rica, May 25, 1908, Mr. Andrew Carnegie giving \$100,000 for a Central American Peace Palace. Each state named one member. In the first case, the court sat in judgment upon nations, the first event of the kind in the history of the world.²⁸⁴ Honduras and Nicaragua accused Salvador and Guatemala of protecting and fomenting a revolution against the plaintiff governments. Three days after the complaint was filed the court, according to the convention establishing it, issued an interlocutory decree fixing the status quo and restraining the revolutionary movement, pending a decision of the case. Five months later, the judgment was rendered, the complaint being dismissed for want of sufficient evidence to support the allegations of Honduras and Nicaragua.²⁸⁵ The case is remarkable in that the court itself urged the contending nations to appear before it. July 8, 1908, the court sent telegrams to the Presidents of the five republics, as Honduras towns had been attacked from the Salvadorean frontier. Costa Rica was asked by the court to use her good offices in mediation.²⁸⁶ The findings of the court were accepted by the states involved. This was an auspicious beginning which brought great assurance to the glorifiers of the institution.

Perhaps it was a bad omen when the Peace Temple at Cartago was destroyed by an earthquake in 1910, although Mr. Carnegie gave \$100,000 for a second temple, which was erected in San José de Costa Rica. A convention was signed at the city of Guatemala, January 10, 1911 by the five governments amending the Convention of Washington, by which the seat of the Central American Court of Justice was transferred to the capital of Costa Rica, and authority

²⁸⁴ *New Inter'l Yr. Bk.*, 1910, p. 46.

²⁸⁵ *Rey*, p. 9.

²⁸⁶ *Am. J. Inter'l Law*, v. 2, 1908, pp. 835, 836.

given to hold sessions elsewhere in Central America, whenever it was deemed expedient.

The promises of those who extravagantly praised the Central American Court of Justice have not been fulfilled. In fact, there were those who from the beginning placed no faith in its success. An ex-president of Honduras said that instead of a judicial tribunal it would be converted into a political one.²⁸⁷ Another Central American wrote:

In the present state of Central America it would be difficult to find five judges capable of setting aside their local prejudices and rivalries. . . . Judges in Central America would be able in but very few cases to decide justly in matters involving Central America. I believe the majority of Nicaraguans would submit with much better grace to a judgment rendered by a United States judge than to one rendered by a judge of his own country.²⁸⁸

The difficulty is seen in such a case as that of General Zelaya, who was President of Nicaragua for fourteen years, when the Constitution limits the executive to one presidential term of four years. Such men would not obey the decisions of a Court of Justice. Mr. Hale, who accompanied the Knox party to Central America, says,

Only a solitary qualification can be made in speaking praise of the instrument of arbitration among the Central American republics, viz., it never arbitrates anything, the Central American republics won't use it. It is beautiful, but it doesn't work. Two of its judges sat side by side at a banquet given Secretary Knox by President Jiminez, and they didn't speak to each other.²⁸⁹

A second creation of the Washington Conference was the Central American International Bureau. The objects for which it was formed may be summarized as follows:

1. The peaceful reorganization of the Central American Union.
2. The introduction of a Central American system of education which shall be popular, pacific, and up-to-date.
3. The development and extension of the home and foreign trade of Central America.

²⁸⁷ Bonilla, *Wilson Doct.*, p. 19.

²⁸⁸ Moncada, p. 25.

²⁸⁹ Hale, in *World's Work*, Aug., 1912, p. 445.

4. The increase and development of agriculture and of the industries which may be of benefit to each state.

5. The reform and unifying of civil, commercial, and penal law, recognizing as fundamental principles the inviolability of life, the respect of property, and the rights of person.

6. The reform and unifying of customs services and of the monetary system, in order to secure a fixed rate of exchange.

7. Sanitation in general and in particular at ports.

8. The improvement of Central American credit.

9. A uniform system of weights and measures.

10. The placing of real estate on a firm and inviolable basis in order that it may serve as a foundation for credit, and permit the establishment of mortgage banks.²⁹⁰

The hope was expressed that with the cordial support of the five governments this important agency would evolve one powerful nation. The Bureau was inaugurated September 15, 1908, at Guatemala City by President Cabrera, with the assistance of Cabinet members, the Supreme Court, army officers, the diplomatic corps, and civic bodies. The impressive ceremonies aroused the greatest enthusiasm. All social classes without distinction took part in the rejoicings. The strains of a new Central American anthem were played amid thunderous applause.²⁹¹

Rules for the Bureau were adopted October 29, 1908. It was composed of a delegate from each republic, who should reside in the city of Guatemala. Annual reunions or Central American Conferences were to be held under its auspices in some one of the capitals. The adoption of the rules was the occasion of much discussion which threatened to wreck the hopes of the friends of the Bureau as an agency for federation. No one can read the bulletin of the Bureau, *Centro-America*, published since January, 1909, without being convinced that the support of the union propaganda is one of the dominant thoughts in the minds of the members of the Bureau.

²⁹⁰ Domville-Fife, *States of C. Am.*, p. 220.

²⁹¹ *For. Rel.*, 1908, p. 417. Domville-Fife, *Guat.*, etc., p. 109.

According to the provisions of the rules, each delegate was to hold office for a term of five years, and was to enjoy in his own country the immunities accorded by the law to the members of a legislative body, and in the other four countries, the usual diplomatic immunities. The arms and national colors of the old Republican Federation of Central America were to be the distinctive insignia of the Bureau. The place of residence should be granted the same right as a legation. Things imported for the use of the Bureau were to enjoy duty exemption.²⁹²

These rules were sent to each of the five states for ratification. Approval was given by Nicaragua and Honduras; Costa Rica and Salvador refused ratification, and Guatemala was non-committal. A grave divergence of interpretation arose regarding the functions of the new organization. The Bureau maintained that its functions were determined by Article I of the Convention "to assist the peaceful reorganization of the Central American Patria." The Bureau argued that as a moral power and a vigilant guardian of Central American interest, it was destined "to serve as the organ of union between the governments in order to permit them without obstacle to proceed to the fulfillment of their contracted obligations."²⁹³ Therefore the Bureau was "a special organization in no way comparable or superior to the governments, but with a sufficient liberty of judgment and of action to enable it to move in its proper sphere and be competent to develop with necessary prudence the common interests of Central America."

Costa Rica and Salvador agreed, on the contrary, that to admit the theory of the Bureau was to accept a power higher than that of the five republics, i.e., to recognize the existence of a Federal Diet hidden under the name "Oficina Internacional Centro-America." Costa Rica proposed that the Central American Conference of 1910 should decide the question of the functions of the Bureau. This proposition was accepted by the other governments.

²⁹² Rey, p. 10.

²⁹³ Rey, p. 11.

The Conference, February, 3, 1910, adopted the point of view supported by Costa Rica and Salvador. The Bureau was to be a commission simply for study. The powers of the Bureau were limited to the following points:

1. To work in favor of the Central American interests enumerated in Article I of the Convention of December 20, 1906, which created the Oficina.

2. To do that work which the signatory states should judge necessary and useful, in order to attain the ends indicated in said Convention, in conformity with Article IV.

3. To fix in its rules the details of the functions which belong to it by virtue of sentences 1 and 2 cited above.

4. To assume the arrangements of interior order designed to protect and develop the Central American interests which have been, or may be, confided to it.

5. To prepare the program of the Annual Central American Conference, instituted by the Congress of Washington, and carry out the work of this Conference which may be committed to it.²⁹⁴

The forces which worked during the Washington Conference to defeat the proposal for union succeeded in curbing the Bureau created by the Conference, so that it could advance the cause of federation only by a campaign of education.

When the Central American Conference closed at Washington, December 16, 1907, amid general congratulations, the delegates must have been conscious that they had done their best to conscientiously remove the most powerful obstacles to the union of Central America. Instructed by experience, the majority were certainly right in their judgment on the union project; it could not have been successful at the time. The goal of a Federal republic was never lost, but it probably was advisable, as a former United States minister to Honduras wrote, that the republics

drift into union rather than be forced into it by a single act. An act of union might seem to savor of revolution. A gradual

²⁹⁴ Rey, p. 13.

development toward union in accordance with the desire of public sentiment would on the contrary be a peaceful evolution.²⁹⁵

The work of the Washington Conference was most praiseworthy, but it did not advance the prospects of union, nor improve the conditions essential for a successful federation. The Conference had really made a union of the states in about every sense except politically. Indeed, one criticism of the Convention was, that it was too ample since it included things not essential for the union of Central America, such as the unification of civil, commercial, and penal legislation, which was useful, but not indispensable to a federal state.²⁹⁶

The greatest contribution of the Central American Peace Conference was negative in character. A deliberate and sincere attempt to realize a federation had failed to interest a majority of the delegations. The treaty-conference method for solving the difficulties of Central America, which had been tried again and again by the Central Americans themselves, was tried once more with the assistance of the United States and Mexico, themselves federated governments. Peace was procured between the nations of the Isthmus, but revolutions continued to be frequent within some of the states. Central America is a "boiling and fire-spitting crater." The clashes of rebellion leaders hamper progress, intimidate foreign capital, and deter immigrants. It soon became evident that the peace treaty was not a complete success, since no adequate instrument for the enforcement of its decrees could be provided. There was no compulsion which could be brought to bear on the republics to arbitrate their internal troubles.

As an afterthought of the Washington Conference, we note that on the initiative of Enrique C. Creel, Mexican Ambassador in Washington, a society was founded, November 24, 1908, entitled "Fraternidad Centro Americana." The principal object was to interest themselves and their associates to stand in private and public for the faithful

²⁹⁵ Brown, *Am. J. Inter'l Law*, Jan., 1908, p. 134.

²⁹⁶ Rey, pp. 25, 26.

observance of the treaty of Washington, and so advance the well-being of the country.²⁹⁷

After eighty-four years of great striving toward the realization of an ideal of nationality, at last, the United States had extended a helping hand, but in vain. Central American conferences would continue to be held, but they could not bring peace and progress. The government at Washington confessed to failure when it inaugurated the policy of virtual protection over the worst offender, Nicaragua.

In conformity to the stipulation of the Washington Convention, Central American conferences have been convened each year at the capitals of the several republics. The first conference met at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, January 3-21, 1909. Nicaragua was unable to be represented. The matters considered included the monetary system, custom houses, weights and measures, fiscal laws, international commerce on sea and land, and the unification of the consular service. The entire week of the Conference was merely preparatory. None of the projected arrangements were to go into operation until further action was taken by the five republics at the Second Central American Conference.²⁹⁸

This Second Conference, assembled at San Salvador February 1-7, 1910. The proposals, agreed upon the preceding year, providing for unification of monetary arrangements, and of weights and measures, Central American commerce, and consular service, were adopted. In addition, plans were approved for a pedagogic institute, and the functions of the "Oficina Internacional Centro-Americana" were outlined.²⁹⁹ The record does not show that there was any official discussion of the question of the formation of a union.

The Third Central American Conference was held at the city of Guatemala, January 1, 1911. The more important

²⁹⁷ *Centro-Am.*, Enero, 1909, p. 98.

²⁹⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1909, pp. 379, 381, 382. Rey, M. Francis, *La Union C. Am.* in *Centro-Am.*, v. 3, no. 1, 1911, p. 43.

²⁹⁹ Rey, in *Centro-Am.*, v. 3, no. 1, p. 43.

questions acted upon were, the change of location of the Central American Court of Justice, the unification of the primary and secondary teaching of Central America, the establishment of a school of agriculture in Salvador, a school of mines in Honduras, and of arts in Nicaragua. Liberty of commerce was discussed and reforms in the postal system enacted.³⁰⁰

The Fourth Central American Conference met at Managua, Nicaragua, January 1, 1912. Conventions were adopted unifying the consular service, establishing international ways of communication in Central America, improving maritime communication, establishing a "commission of relations," perfecting the security of the telegraph service of the five republics, and establishing in Central America a postal system.³⁰¹

The Fifth Central American Conference convened at San José de Costa Rica, January 2-16, 1913. This marked the last of the meetings arranged by the Central American Peace Conference held at Washington in 1907.

The Sixth Central American Conference was held at Tegucigalpa, January 1-10, 1914. This conference is significant especially because of the statement made by President Carlos Lara of the Oficina Internacional Centro-Americana, that as a majority of the pacts entered into at the Central American conferences had not been approved by the various governments, it was thought best not to present any question except what was already on the program.³⁰²

It would be a blunder to ignore the immense educational value of these conferences. For the purposes of mutual acquaintance and the cultivation of intra-state friendships, they proved an excellent opportunity. The question we raise concerns the value of these conferences for the realization of the vision of true Central American patriots. Unfortunately the states do not drift toward union. Hope

³⁰⁰ Rey, in *Centro-Am.*, v. 3, no. 1, p. 43.

³⁰¹ *Centro-Am.*, v. 4, no. 1, p. 15.

³⁰² *Centro-Am.*, v. 5, no. 4, p. 488.

of peaceful evolution into a federation grows dim, and not thus may the goal be reached.

A Central American has summed up the results of Central American history in a concise and forceful paragraph. Although written December 30, 1882, it applies to the entire epoch of Central American independence.

The history of the question of Central American nationality is a history of tears and blood. The word has not been pronounced a single time by the governments of Central America without being followed by one of those insensate struggles in which no one knows the object of the dispute in which all lose: struggles in which we have exhausted our strength, we have destroyed our prosperity, we have closed the fountains of our progress; we have blotted our name from the great book in which the world records the names of the enlightened nations; we have killed our credit, we have covered ourselves with opprobrium and shame, we have demoralized our country and finally we have put off the day of its reconstruction. . . . The name of "Central American Union" has been the constant declaration of our wars, . . . the kiss of Judas under which we have disguised our hatreds, the hypocritical word with which we have hidden our miserable ambitions."³⁰³

CHAPTER X

THE OBSTACLES TO FEDERATION

The one ray of light on the horizon of Central American political life is the hope of federation which persists undimmed, in spite of constant failure. The fulfillment of the hope appears a long way off, but it is remarkable that the hope should not disappear in face of the discouragements of succeeding generations.

The experience of the past proves that the desired union will be hard to obtain, and once realized, harder to maintain. It behooves us to inquire as to the obstacles of federation, and to discuss more fully the underlying causes of failure.

1. The jealousy of the states is one obstacle to federation. It is the spirit exhibited by Salvador at the very dawn of independence, and in evidence at every stage of

³⁰³ *For. Rel.*, 1883, Manuel J. Morales.

the process of national development. Morales expressed the thought when he said in 1882,

We are Central Americans, yes; but first we are Salvadoreans; therefore we protest against the most beautiful, but impossible idea of reconstructing Central America.³⁰⁴ Guatemala is the giant among the republics of Central America. Her rulers with few exceptions have been ambitious to swallow up the others. For this reason, every Salvadorean hates and fears Guatemala.³⁰⁵

Guatemala has not been the only state to attempt the establishment of a dictatorship with the ultimate purpose of making an empire of Central America, but the chief state has been the worst offender, as it offered a more favorable field for ambitious leaders. Neither has Salvador been the sole republic to fear Guatemala. Zelaya of Nicaragua, and Cabrera of Guatemala were intensely jealous of each other.³⁰⁶ The two middle states, Salvador and Honduras, have lived side by side more peaceably than the others. There have been few breaks to the present day. Together they have enjoyed victory and suffered defeat; together they have striven to restore and then to destroy the Federal unity of Central America.³⁰⁷

The profound individuality of these countries prominent under Spanish dominion has been accentuated under independence. There are differences lying deep in the character of the inhabitants, though they have the same origin, customs, and language.³⁰⁸ Mr. Williamson, who traveled through the states in 1873-1874, realized the strength of local prejudices which he said were "not based upon conflicts or diversity of interests, but seemingly the result of traditional antipathies."³⁰⁹

But suppose the jealous spirit could be exorcised long enough to establish a federation. How long would it last? The national union would endure until an ambitious gover-

³⁰⁴ *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 38.

³⁰⁵ Hale in *World's Work*, Aug., 1912, p. 446.

³⁰⁶ Perigny, p. 240.

³⁰⁷ Domville-Fife, *Guatemala*, etc., p. 277.

³⁰⁸ Perigny, p. 244.

³⁰⁹ Williamson to Fish, *For. Rel.*, 1874, p. 172.

nor of a section set his heart on the general power. The unity then would be forcibly broken, for it would be

a weak spider web, broken before being concluded, whose meshes would be united before the will of the intriguer or broken at the stroke of the first sabre raised against them.³¹⁰

The experience of the past offers no promise of near realization of federation without help from without. The federation is necessary to create the public spirit and overcome the traditional isolation and jealousy of the several republics. The necessary federation, they cannot establish and maintain.³¹¹

2. Another obstacle to Federation is the revolutionary habit of Central America. The internal crises and rivalries in Central America, have the same significance as those signaling the first period of all the Spanish American republics. The discouraging fact is the perpetuity of this first period of Central America. Stephens in the preface to his *Incidents of Travel* referred to the then latest news from Central America and expressed the belief that the civil wars of which he had been the witness were forever over, and that the "republic of Central America would now assume her place among the nations." He doubtless had in mind the convention for reorganizing the republic, decreed in 1841, irregularly in session for a year or two, but issuing finally in the "Pacto de Chinandega" which from the start was a dead letter, the prelude to new and fiercer wars and the complete disruption of the Confederation.³¹² Suarez, although he does not wish to apologize for civil fights, thinks these revolutions could more properly be called evolutions, resulting in progress, and the tran-

³¹⁰ Morales, Manuel J. in *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 36.

³¹¹ It may be said that the United States, during the critical period had just such a spirit of intra-state jealousy, with which to contend. This is very true, but the adoption of the Constitution occasioned the birth of a nation. It is our firm conviction that the jealousies of Central American States are not ineradicable. However, up to the present year, they have not overcome them, and there is absolutely no promise in the past failures that the near future will witness the miracle of regeneration.

³¹² *Nation*, July 28, 1887, p. 47.

quillity of those countries.³¹³ In Central America we look in vain for the evolution, though the revolution is constantly in sufficient evidence. Bailey wrote in 1850,

In twenty-five years there has been no real or beneficial improvement in social conditions. The stagnation he attributed to "intestinal disorders, which have excited contests for supremacy and produced resistance to the adoption of institutions that should be advantageous to all alike."³¹⁴

A revolution in Central America has been defined as a "disorderly and violent contention among selfish politicians;"³¹⁵ it does not originate with the masses nor is an alteration of the form of government involved. The only method by which the personnel of the government may be changed is by revolution. Nicaragua is a fair example of a military despotism. The President has been usually a successful military leader, who has entered office by force, and maintained his leadership with a strong hand. In a speech incident to the visit of Secretary Knox to Central America, A Diaz, President of Nicaragua said,

It has been a republic for almost one hundred years without having known republican methods in that time, save at brief intervals. Political struggles are not a luminous contest of ideas and principles, but terrible duels between despots and ill-directed efforts of the people in search of happiness never attained.³¹⁶

The ideal of union has done much to perpetuate the revolutionary habit in Central America, since many disturbances have been due to the desire for political union, or, if a union has been established, for individual independence. With the exception of Morazan, all who have tried to realize the ideal of union have done so to satisfy their selfish ambitions.³¹⁷ The conflicts between the several states have been often caused by the efforts of these politicians to attain personal control of the general government.³¹⁸

³¹³ Suarez, p. 30.

³¹⁴ Bailly, *Cen. Am.*, Pref., IX.

³¹⁵ Scruggs, *Col. and Ven. Republics*, p. 146.

³¹⁶ *Speeches Incident to Knox Visit*, p. 34.

³¹⁷ Perigny, p. 243.

³¹⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 714. Calderon, *Lat. Am.*, p. 222. Lombard, *New Honduras*, p. 22.

What are the results of the revolutions? President Taft in his message to Congress, December 3, 1912, spoke of the results of the revolution in Nicaragua, during the summer of that year, as

useless loss of life, devastation of property, bombardment of defenseless cities, killing and wounding of women and children, torturing of non-combatants to exact contributions, the suffering of thousands of human beings.³¹⁹

In general the effects of the revolutionary habit are even more serious. The schools and churches have been affected—in Honduras the National Library has been used as a barracks;³²⁰ the government is obliged to spend a large part of the public income on the army and for war claims; and the lowering of physical standards is accompanied by a debasing effect upon the ideals of the people. As a result, the people have lost confidence in each other,³²¹ and the civil wars have opposed enormous barriers to the progress of these countries.³²²

The rewards of a successful revolution are so alluring that the revolutionist is always prominent. Some revolutions are fomented by a President to retain the executive office after his term has expired, and some are fomented by rivals to oust the incumbent.³²³ National unity cannot be established under such conditions. Although federation would remove the cause for most of the revolutionary outbreaks, and an efficient police force should then be able to prevent any serious insurrections yet Alvarez is probably right when he says,

If the individual republics are at the mercy of revolution, a central republic would be also. If each separate government is a one-man power, the central republic would be also.³²⁴

3. The corruption of political life is a serious obstacle to federation in Central America. Inseparable from the

³¹⁹ *M. and P. of the Pres.*, v. 9, p. 60.

³²⁰ *M. and P. of the Pres.*, v. 9, p. 60.

³²¹ McClintock, in *World's Work*, Aug., 1911, p. 959.

³²² Alvarez, *Am. Prob. of Inter'l Law*, p. 22.

³²³ Waleffe, *Fair Land of C. Am.*, p. 87. Sears, p. 500.

³²⁴ Sears, p. 501.

revolutionary habit, the politics of Central America requires a separate treatment. The contradiction between the loftiness of the constitution and the baseness of political life is striking.³²⁵

Guatemala is a pure despotism under which two millions of people are exploited by a tyrant and his band of retainers.³²⁶ A quotation from Mr. Hale's article written after his return from Central America gives a graphic portrayal of actual conditions.

Estrada Cabrera, President of Guatemala, had not left his palace except by an underground passage to a neighboring house for many months before Mr. Knox visited the capital. Then he was seen in several places, closely guarded; among other places, at the American legation, where he attended a dinner. But when the hour of departure came, the President's state carriage with its jingling horses and its escort rolled away, empty, and two minutes later the President came out quickly, jumped into a dilapidated hack, and went home by a side street.³²⁷

Partisanship has been stronger than patriotism. Stephen relates that Morazan's soldiers even after a victory, marched into the plaza, stacked arms, and shouted, "Viva Morazan!" In the morning the shout was "Viva Carrera!" No one cried, "Viva la Patria!"³²⁸

Elections are a farce; the President in office is the omnipotent political boss; the press too often is but a tool in the power of the latest Dictator, and the whole machinery of government is given up to the professional politicians. A packed primary usually ratifies the state of the party "bosses," and at the election by threats or strategy a good proportion of the votes are kept from the ballot boxes. The count usually is unfair, and the defeated candidate issues a "manifesto" making charges of irregularity, and appealing to the patriotism of the country. He gathers a following, becomes the leader of a faction, and when the time seems auspicious, the revolution begins.³²⁹

³²⁵ Ugate, *El porvenir de l' Am. Lat.*, p. 205.

³²⁶ Hale in *World's Work*, Aug., 1912, p. 447.

³²⁷ Hale in *World's Work*, Aug., 1912, p. 447.

³²⁸ Stephen, *Incidents of Travel*, v. 2, p. 85.

³²⁹ Waleffe, p. 88. Scrugg, *Col. and Ven. Repub.*, p. 148.

The federation will take away from many of the professional politicians and office-holders their calling, for the larger the nation, the fewer the offices, especially the higher ones. This class do not face the prospects of "degrading" labor with any degree of pleasure, and will struggle long ere they will allow the change to take place, fraught with such dire consequences to themselves, and full of such promise for Central America.³³⁰

4. A survey of the population of Central America reveals a further important obstacle to federation. The Central American population is made up of the descendants of the Spanish colonists, Indian aborigines, and negroes freed in 1821. The whole is mixed in diverse proportions. The Indian element, though numerically superior, has never had any part in political power.³³¹ The greater part of the population in the three principal republics is made up of poor Indians accustomed to slavery and easily submitting to dictatorial regimes. The two smallest states, with a larger per cent of white inhabitants, have developed more rapidly under a more liberal rule.³³²

In Guatemala, 60 per cent of the population are pure Indians, who do the laborious work and the fighting. The Creoles form only one-tenth of the population, yet they own a good proportion of the wealth of the country; they are the business and professional men, as well as the land-owners. The Mestizos or Ladinos, make up the remainder of the population. They speak Spanish and generally regard themselves as descendants of the conquering race; jointly with the Creoles they hold the political power; they are the progressive element, and are extending the Spanish language at the expense of the native tongues. The Indians are returned as Ladinos as soon as they adopt Spanish in general intercourse. The half-breeds absorbing all the native population claim to constitute the Guate-

³³⁰ Waleffe, p. 42: Zelaya's fortune was estimated at 5,000,000 though his salary was 100,000 pesos. The widow of Barrios had a fortune of \$15,000,000. Bonsal, *Am. Med.*, p. 348. Ugarte, p. 17.

³³¹ Belly, p. 71.

³³² Perigny, p. 244.

malan nationality. A substantial middle class has not yet developed.³³³

In Nicaragua, intermarriage between the original Indians, Spaniards, and negro slaves has produced a composite race. Intermarriage of emigrants, including Dutch, French, and English, has produced a half-breed type with blue eyes and fair hair. The Indians of pure race are few. Nearly all the original Spanish element has been absorbed in the Mestizo population which constitutes the Nicaraguan nationality.³³⁴

In Honduras the white element is small. One-fourth of the population are full-blooded Indians, many of whom still occupy their original lands in the western districts near the Guatemalan frontier. A portion of the Indian tribes are christianized, but about ninety thousand retain their wild life in the mountains. About three-fourths of the population are Ladinos who constitute the Honduran nationality. On the Atlantic Coast a strong negro strain is evident. In some of the coast districts the Zambos (African and Indian half-breeds) are the dominant elements.³³⁵

In Salvador the aboriginal and mixed races form the bulk of the population. The estimate for 1914, being 772,200 Mestizos, and 234,648 Indians, in a total population of 1,225,835. The early Spanish settlers are merged in a Ladinos race. Twenty thousand are of pure European stock. A distinct negro strain sometimes seen is due to the black slaves before the emancipation.³³⁶

In Costa Rica the proportion of Spanish blood is greater than in any of the other five republics, although the bulk of the population is a fusion, as in the other states. The four thousand native Indians dwell in stockades in a savage and unchristianized state. About eight thousand Europeans are in the country.³³⁷

³³³ Tomaso Caivano, etc., p. 305. Keane, *C. and S. Am.*, v. 2, p. 173. *Statesmen's Yr. Bk.*, 1915, p. 1037.

³³⁴ Keane, *C. and S. Am.*, v. 2, pp. 233, 234. *Statesmen's Yr. Bk.*, 1915, p. 1175. Enoch, *S. and C. Am.*, p. 445.

³³⁵ Enoch, p. 445. Keane, p. 204.

³³⁶ Keane, p. 190. *Statesmen's Yr. Bk.*, 1915, p. 1315.

³³⁷ Enoch, p. 445. Keane, v. 2, p. 253. Bates, p. 138.

Walker and some of his fellow-filibusters had clear ideas of the remedy for the ills of Central America—the supplanting of an inferior by a superior race. Mr. Wells wrote,

That the effete and decadent descendants of the early Spanish colonists must eventually succumb and give place to the superior activity and intelligence of the Anglo-Saxon, none who have lived in Central America or Mexico will dispute.³³⁸

Squier wrote,

It appears that the only hope of Central America consists in averting the numerical decline of its white population and increasing that element in the composition of its people.³³⁹

A recent traveler gives his impression of Honduras and Nicaragua when he quotes an American Consul-General as saying, “If left to themselves they will go back to barbarism.”³⁴⁰

This survey of racial conditions enables us to understand the persistency of the revolutionary habit and the power wielded by the professional politicians. With such a heterogeneous population, the great majority ignorant and backward, lacking the sense of law, order, and justice, republics may exist in name but not in reality. However, the situation is not hopeless. A new race may be making which will be superior to any now in Latin America, one abundantly able to carry out the constitutional principles of their government, keep the peace, and prosper. In the meantime, the problems of race must continue to produce disastrous consequences.

5. Not only is the character of the population an obstacle to federation, but the sparseness of the population accentuates the difficulty. Reclus says,

The highlands of Guatemala, the tablelands of Salvador, the valleys of Honduras, the depressions which extend from the Bay of Fonseca to the Lake of Nicaragua, and finally the plateau located high in the midst of the volcanic chain in Costa Rica are so many centers of independent life which scarcely have natural relations between them.³⁴¹

³³⁸ Wells, W. V., *Walker's Ex. to Nic.*, p. 13.

³³⁹ Squier, *Notes on C. Am.*, p. 58.

³⁴⁰ Putnam, p. 228.

³⁴¹ Suarez, p. 15.

The need for better means of communication has always been felt, and much has been done to improve them. The sparseness of the population and the difficulty of communication is thought by some to have been a sufficient cause of the break-up of the first federation. It has been an obstacle ever since.

6. The policy of the United States has been a detriment to the best interests of Central America. Senator S. O. Thatcher in 1895, in a speech on a bill entitled "An act to promote the political progress and commercial prosperity of the American nations," clearly summarized our treatment of Central America:

Our country has until recently turned an icy look upon these struggling republics, and our diplomacy has been no whit warmer or more friendly towards them than it has towards the several despotisms of the eastern hemisphere. . . . Overtures for a more kindly fraternity have been treated by us with silence, and an effort on the part of these peoples to draw near to us in more rapid and certain communications have been met by cold indifference.³⁴²

Notwithstanding all our neglect of these states, they long continued to admire our greatness and longed for a closer bond of fellowship.

At first the policy of the United States was dictated by Washington's farewell address, which attained the power of a fetish. Washington had said,

The great rule for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.

Jefferson took up the fetish and made an idol of it. In his first inaugural address he said,

Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.

The policy of non-intervention should never have applied to the Caribbean countries. Indeed, it was severely tested in the struggle of the Spanish American colonies for independence, but "under the guardian care of Monroe and

³⁴² 49 *Cong. 1 Sess. Sen. Repts.*, v. 6, no. 941, pp. 4, 5.

John Quincy Adams it was scrupulously adhered to.”²⁴³ The Washington Precept was the inspiration of our selfish policy toward Latin America, which was well exemplified by James Buchanan who, in 1826, during a debate in Congress on the Panama Congress, introduced in the House of Representatives the following resolutions:

In the opinion of the House the United States ought not to form any alliance with all or any of the South American republics, nor ought they to become parties with them to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the colonization upon the continent of America, but the people of the United States should be left free to act in any crisis in such manner as their feelings of friendship toward these republics or as their own home policy may at the time dictate.

The great opportunity to express a real brotherly feeling toward the rising republics at the south passed unheeded. In the succeeding years, at least until this time the internal quarrels of Latin America aroused little interest in the United States; no administration showed any desire to give aid or assistance.

Beginning with the administration of Polk, the revived Monroe Doctrine, the fear of foreign aggression, the principal of “manifest destiny,” and the fever for national expansion, awakened an interest in Latin America.

The Cincinnati Democratic Convention of 1856, adopted four resolutions that brought false hope to Walker; the most important were:

1. *Resolved:* That our geographical and political position in reference to other states on this continent no less than the interest of our commerce and the development of our growing powers, requires that we hold sacred the principles involved in the Monroe Doctrine, and their binding import which admits of no misconstruction, and shall be applied with unbending rigidity.

2. *Resolved:* That free communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans shall be secured by a timely, efficient control of the governments of the states within whose dominion it lies. We can under no circumstances surrender our preponderance in the adjustment of all questions arising out of it.

3. *Resolved:* That in view of such commanding interest the people of the United States cannot but sympathize with the efforts which are being made by the people of Central America to

²⁴³ Moore, J. B., *Am. Diplom.*, p. 135.

regenerate the portion of the continent which covers a passage across the Oceanic Isthmus.

4. *Resolved*: That the Democratic party will expect of the next administration that every proper effort be made to insure our ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico, to maintain a permanent protection of the great outlets through which is emptied into its waters the products raised upon our soil, and the commodities created by the industry of the people, in our western valleys and the Union at large.³⁴⁴

The real purpose of these resolutions was to safeguard United States interests in a canal through the Isthmus, and not, as Walker supposed, to support the establishment of a federation in Central America.

From 1869 to 1884, Fish, Evarts, and Blaine stood for the "doctrine of paramount interest," and espoused the cause of an "American doctrine." Professor Hart's commentary on the period is sufficiently severe:

Whatever the cause, no party, no section of the country, no leading statesman, was willing to propose that a single American soldier, or sailor should be sacrificed in order to help the Latin-Americans to be better."³⁴⁵

It has been stated that the United States government has put a premium on revolution by the policy of recognizing a President *de facto* without inquiring narrowly into the validity of his claim.³⁴⁶ The principle on which the government has acted has been that an election is a domestic affair and if the people appeared satisfied it was not for the United States to complain against fraud or insurrection. Recently, the administration at Washington has changed its policy. As United States interests increased in Mexico and Central America, it became necessary to check revolutions and improve the conditions which were bordering on anarchy. By the present method, provisional governments will be recognized only when established by constitutional sanction and when they enjoy the approval of the people. It is hoped that this policy will check revolutions and civil wars, but the new regime has not been altogether successful.

³⁴⁴ *Boston Post.*, June 6, 1856.

³⁴⁵ Hart, *Mon. Doct.*, p. 182.

³⁴⁶ Lowe, A. M., *Contem. Rev.*, Jan., 1914, p. 24.

The United States it will be remembered has encouraged the plan of Central American Union, instructing its diplomats to aid the movement by means of conferences, and thus has offered an opportunity for the attainment of federation by peaceful methods. The main purpose of the Knox tour in the Caribbean was claimed by some to be the support of a project for the union of the five Central American republics.³⁴⁷ During the past few years, however, the effects of United States intervention in Central America have been directly opposed to the policy of unification; at every crisis in the evolution of Central American Federation, when hope of success was bright, the United States triggered the wheels. Encouragement was offered only at times when the prospects of success were decidedly meagre. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the more hopeful efforts have been those resorting to force of arms; while those with dubious prospects have depended on the peaceful methods of conference and diplomacy. Upon the whole, a careful study of the history of Central American Federation convinces us that the policy pursued by the United States had hindered rather than helped the Union.

7. The chapter of British Interference reveals a continuous meddling in the affairs of the Central American republics, which has been a serious obstacle to union.³⁴⁸

A fair summary of Great Britain's association with Central America during the period of Spanish dominion is given by Mr. Roche:

So long as Central America remained a province of Spain, England's policy was one of peaceful words and hostile deeds. Binding herself by treaty after treaty to renunciation of all claims upon the country, she steadily maintained and extended her hold upon various objective points—Ruatan, Belize, the Bay Islands, which command the Gulf of Mexico, being her favorite spoils. Some equivocal clause in a treaty, a frivolous pretense of avenging some imaginary dishonor, a buccaneer's legacy, a negro king's grant, if no better offered, were put forth as the excuse for armed occupation.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁷ Bonsal, *Am. Mediterranean*, p. 347.

³⁴⁸ Miss Williams in *Anglo-Am. Isthmian Diplomacy* gives a scholarly recital of facts based on the sources.

³⁴⁹ Roche, p. 62.

With the independence of Central America, a new chapter of British interference begins, involving the diplomatic activities of the United States.

In 1835, the government of Central America, having succeeded to all the rights of Spain, asked the United States government to mediate with that of Great Britain, with the view to restrain the British settlers at Belize from trespassing on the territory beyond the confines allotted to them by the treaties between Great Britain and Spain.³⁵⁰ Mr. Alvarez, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central American Confederation in his appeal to the United States, used these pertinent words:

Suffer me to remind you that it has always been an object of the policy of the United States that there should be no European settlements upon the American Coast, and that the aggressions and encroachments at Belize upon the territory of Central America are a dangerous and alarming violation of this principle. It belongs to your government and happy republic to place herself in the vanguard of a policy so interesting to the new American states, and to uphold with her name our rights in the presence of England.³⁵¹

In March, 1835, the English residents of Belize had established a colonial government under the name of British Honduras, and announced to Guatemala the assumption of independence, claiming five times the territory indicated in the old Spanish grant.³⁵² The President of the United States deemed it inexpedient to comply with the request of Central America. It seems that the government was ill-informed and fearful of blundering.³⁵³

The annexation of Texas to the United States in 1845 inspired England to renewed efforts to dominate the Isthmus. The Central American states were informed of the assumption of practical sovereignty over the Mosquito Kingdom by Great Britain. A storm of protest went forth

³⁵⁰ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., Sen. Rept., no. 407, p. 10. Petin, *Les États Unis*, etc., p. 90, note.

³⁵¹ 32 Cong. 2 Sess., *Sen. Ex. Doc. 27*, p. 4.

³⁵² Walker, *Ocean to Ocean*, p. 50. 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *Sen. Ex. Doc. 27*, p. 9.

³⁵³ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *Sen. Ex. Doc. 27*, p. 9.

especially from Nicaragua; Senor Buitago, Nicaraguan Secretary of State, in a letter to James Buchanan, United States Secretary of State, November 12, 1847, solicited the friendly offices of the United States:

The United States is the natural protector of all the Republican states of the Continent, the center of the hopes of the American cause. Nicaragua, who derives its first impulse from you and is animated by your example, doubts not that her representations will be received on a subject which threatens her institutions and independence, and affects the interests of all the American republics.³⁵⁴ The object of the British government is declared to be "the control of the Atlantic extremity of a canal route which would give it a preponderance on the American Continent."

Buchanan made no reply to this stirring appeal.

The Nicaraguan was not mistaken in divining the purpose of Great Britain. By 1848, the subject of an inter-oceanic canal had become of vital importance. Until 1844, Nicaragua made no serious efforts to assert her sovereignty over territory occupied by the Mosquitos. About that time complaints were made to the British authorities at Jamaica that aggressions were being made by Spanish American states.³⁵⁵ In 1847 Great Britain drove the Nicaraguan troops out of San Juan and held the place under the fiction of a Mosquito protectorate.³⁵⁶ Complaint was made to the Secretary of State, November 12, 1847, that Central America suffered grievously from advances of British power,

just at the moment when the four states which have remained faithful to their compact and national union, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, are occupied in determining the political system under which they are to exist as a federal republic.³⁵⁷

Mr. Salmas, Secretary of Foreign Relations of Nicaragua in his letter of March 17, 1848 to Mr. Buchanan, Secre-

³⁵⁴ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, App., p. 76. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *H. Ex. Doc.*, 75, p. 13.

³⁵⁵ *Canad. Mag.*, v. 12, p. 387. Prof. Adam Shortt, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

³⁵⁶ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, App., p. 79. *Br. Parlia. Papers*, 1847-8 Coms. LXV, p. 58.

³⁵⁷ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *H. Ex. Doc.* 75, p. 13.

tary of State, fully sets forth the alleged aggressions of the British government in seizing the territory of Nicaragua in the name of their ally, the Mosquito king. No answer was given.³⁵⁸

The movement of Great Britain becomes perfectly clear, when we take it in connection with a reported diplomatic negotiation with Costa Rica. October, 1848, Mr. Osma, Minister of Peru to Great Britain, while in Washington, gave information to Buchanan, Secretary of State,

that Senor Castro, Governor of Costa Rica (as he had been credibly informed) had offered to place that state under the protection of the British government.

No instructions were given to Mr. Bancroft to remonstrate officially against this new protectorate, but he was informed that

in case the information given by Mr. Osma was well-founded, then he should be vigilant in preventing unofficially, and by private conversation in the proper quarter, the occupation by Great Britain of the proffered protectorate.³⁵⁹

A report from London, received by Mr. Clayton, September 14, 1849, stated that Mr. Costellas in a letter to Mr. Bancroft of July 12, mentioned the fact of a cession to England of Costa Rican territory on the south side of the San Juan. If this had been carried out, Great Britain would have been in exclusive control of the whole line of the proposed communication from the port of San Juan on the Atlantic to Punta Arenas on the Pacific, without touching anywhere on territory which they admitted to belong to Nicaragua.³⁶⁰

In addition to the seizure of the Mosquito Coast as far south as San Juan, the name of which was changed to Greytown, and which comprised an extension of 40,000 square miles, the Bay Islands were taken possession of. At the same time the British-Pacific squadron seized, October 16, 1849, the Isla del Tigre in the Gulf of Fonseca,

³⁵⁸ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *H. Ex. Doc. 75*, p. 5.

³⁵⁹ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., *H. Ex. Doc. 75*, p. 6.

³⁶⁰ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *S. Ex. Doc. 27*, p. 14.

which commanded the western terminus of the canal.³⁶¹ England was master of Central America through the possession of the termini of the canal route.

Although Tigre Island was fortified by the British, it was given up by them, December 26, 1849, and in May 1850, the American flag was raised by Squier, as the island had been ceded conditionally to the United States by Honduras by a treaty September 28, 1848. Secretary of State Clayton disapproved the treaty and the flag of the United States was hauled down on the Island, when the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was signed.³⁶²

Clayton's policy seemed to be accounted for in part by political considerations. President Taylor did not have a majority in the Senate, so it was decided to save the party from defeat by averting a break with Great Britain and keep the whole question out of public discussion. The British acquisitions in Central America at the time, exclusive of such smaller items as Ruatan and Tigre Islands,³⁶³ embraced a total of 66,600 square miles over which Great Britain exercised full control. This territory was nearly one-third of Central America, and equal to two-thirds the area of Great Britain.³⁶⁴

Continuous and emphatic insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine during the preceding years would have spared the United States the humiliation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and the troubles arising from its interpretation. It was increasingly evident that the Federation of Central America was the last thing desired by Great Britain, engaged in diplomatic intrigues and forceful intervention for the purpose of getting control of the future trade route of the world.

The sole object aimed at by the United States under the existing conditions was to prevent Great Britain getting a permanent hold on that part of the Isthmus. Mr. Clayton on June 5, 1850 wrote to the Supreme Dictator of Nicaragua,

³⁶¹ Huberich, p. 7. *Br. Parlia. Papers*, 1856, Coms. LX, pp. 33-35.

³⁶² 31 Cong., 2 Sess., *S. Ex. Doc.* 43, pp. 19, 21, 22, 46, 48, 69.

³⁶³ Tigre Island was given up after two months occupation.

³⁶⁴ Crow, *C. Am.*, p. 220, quoted by Squier, *Nic.*, v. 2, p. 450.

Under those guarantees (of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty) the Central American republics, united in one confederation and union for their common defense and happiness, will, it is ardently hoped, assume a rank among the nations of the continent, realizing the proudest anticipations of those who have made their brilliant destiny a study.³⁶⁵

The British authorities at Belize, July 17, 1852, announced

her most gracious Majesty our Queen, has been pleased to constitute and make the Islands of Roatan, Bonacca, Utila, Barbarat, Helene, and Morat, to be a colony to be known and designated as the colony of the Bay Islands. This declaration was signed "by command of her Majesty's superintendent, Augustus Fred Gore, Colonial Secretary."³⁶⁶

Honduras immediately proposed that the United States take her territory and annex it at once, rather than see it torn from her piecemeal by England.³⁶⁷ Elaborate correspondence was carried on through the years 1854-1856, between Mr. Buchanan, American Minister at London, and Lord Clarendon, but the results were unsatisfactory, as a treaty negotiated in 1856 was rejected by the United States Senate.³⁶⁸ The naval forces of both countries were increased in the Caribbean and peace hung on a slender thread.

A sidelight of the feeling of the United States during these negotiations is gained by reading a speech delivered in Congress:

Enforce the treaty even if there is war with Great Britain. . . . If in its results, the ties which would exist between ourselves and Central America as guardian and ward. . . . if the sympathy of a common republicanism should be drawn yet closer even to a political union. . . . I can see nothing of evil anyway in the prospect.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁵ 34 Cong., 1 Sess., *S. Ex. Doc. 24*, p. 4. Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, in spite of the opposition of Costa Rica and Guatemala attempted a union in 1850.

³⁶⁶ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *S. Rept.* p. 407. *Brit. St. Papers*, XLVI, pp. 246f.

³⁶⁷ 34 Cong., 3 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, App. p. 100.

³⁶⁸ Dallas-Clarendon Treaty, Oct. 17, 1856. England rejected proposed amendments. See Buchanan's Message, Dec. 8, 1857. *Br. Parlia. Papers* 1860, Coms. LXVIII, pp. 31-2.

³⁶⁹ 32 Cong., 2 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, App., p. 79, E. C. Marshall of Cali.

The Democratic Review for 1852 further enlightens us in the charge it makes against Fillmore's administration that:

It has violated our plighted faith to Nicaragua, becoming the instrument in British hands for the accomplishment of its political humiliation and territorial dismemberment.³⁷⁰

The filibustering expeditions complicated matters still further, together with civil wars. The active agency and interference of Great Britain is seen throughout, and but for that interference there would have been at least a chance of a republic of the Central American states.³⁷¹

The Mosquito territory remained a source of contention, furnishing numerous occasions for British intervention, until 1905, when the British government by treaty agreed to recognize the absolute sovereignty of Nicaragua over the territory of Mosquitia, now called the Department of Bluefields.

The recital of British interference in Central America must convince any candid reader that the outcries of Central American patriots against such intervention have been justified since it militated against the realization of their dreams of Federation. General Munoz spoke to Mr. Squier with great bitterness of the British aggressions during the critical times in the attempted development of Central American nationality.³⁷² It would be difficult to decide whether the policy of the United States or the British interference was the greater obstacle of federation.

8. The ambition of Mexico has been almost as serious an obstacle to Central American Federation, as the indifference of the United States, or the interference of Great Britain. A glance at the map shows that the weakness of Mexico herself, and the fear of foreign complications, has probably saved Central America from being swallowed piece-meal by her greater neighbor. As the more bulky United States expanded southwestward at the expense of Mexico, so the territorial superiority of Mexico would indicate the natural expansion southward.

³⁷⁰ *Dem. Rev.*, v. 31, p. 338.

³⁷¹ Moore, *Digest*, v. 6, p. 444.

³⁷² Squier, *Nic.*, p. 178.

The general principal involved has been well-stated, thus:

When two contiguous states are separated by a long line of frontiers and one of the two rapidly increases, full of youth and vigor, while the other possesses, together with a small population, rich and desirable territories, and is troubled by continual revolutions which exhaust and weaken it, the first will inevitably encroach upon the second, just as water will always seek to regain its own level.³⁷³

As soon as the Central American republics had become independent, Mexico showed a tendency to increase her territory by encroaching on them. Even before the declaration of independence, September 15, 1821, Chiapas on September 3, 1821 had confirmed the proclamation of her annexation to Mexico; and when Guatemala separated from Mexico in 1823, Chiapas, did not follow her example. The armies of Mexico successfully passed through the whole of Guatemala but were stopped by the patriotic Salvadoreans. Chiapas and Soconusco were brought under the influence of Mexico. On May 3, 1824, Soconusco voted for annexation to Mexico; and in the following September, Chiapas, by vote of a majority of the inhabitants, ratified its final incorporation into Mexico.

The good offices of the United States with Mexico, on behalf of the republic of Central America were requested by a newspaper article, October 3, 1830, which was undoubtedly inspired, if not written, by General Arce, former President of Central America. False impressions had tended to create jealousies between the two republics, and to persuade the government of Mexico that it was necessary for its safety that it should intervene in the affairs of Central America. The Mexican papers had unjustly pictured Central America as submerged in anarchy.³⁷⁴

In 1832, Guatemalan troops violated the territory of Soconusco; the question of boundaries had reached a critical stage, which ended, in 1842 when Santa Anna occupied Soconusco with his troops and annexed it to Mexico. The

³⁷³ Coolidge, A. C., *U. S. as a World-Power*.

³⁷⁴ 25 Cong., 2 Sess. *H. Doc. 351 (Annex)*, pp. 74-76, 391-395.

boundary controversy was finally settled by the mediation of President Cleveland.³⁷⁵

The sentiment of Central America toward the imperial usurpation of Maximilian seems to have been divided. Guatemala, owing to the boundary dispute, sympathized with the French Empire, as did Costa Rica.³⁷⁶ On the other hand in Salvador there was from the first a feeling of hostility to the French and to the monarchical party.³⁷⁷ Had the Empire of Maximilian prospered, it doubtless would have threatened the independence of the Central American republics.

In 1881, the report reached Washington that Mexico intended to precipitate hostilities for the purpose of extending her territory by conquest.

The information possessed by the State Department intimates the probable extension of hostilities to the other Central American states, and their eventual absorption into the Mexican Federal System.³⁷⁸

Minister Logan had reported that Barrios, President of Guatemala, was intensely hated in Mexico, and that he returned the feeling with compound interest.³⁷⁹

In 1887, June 27, President M. L. Barillas of Guatemala signed a decree, making himself dictator of Guatemala. Mexico refused to recognize the government, and there was apprehension of Mexican intervention. The good office of the United States was requested. Although President Diaz gave his word to Barillas

that the Mexican government would respect all that the Guatemalan people in the exercise of their sovereignty may do or approve with relation to the institutions which are to rule them.

Mexican troops were sent in July to the Guatemalan frontier, ostensibly to protect Mexican interests. There was danger of a collision. The desired assurance from

³⁷⁵ 49 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. Rept.*, v. 6, No. 941, p. 13.

³⁷⁶ *For. Rel.*, 1867, p. 290.

³⁷⁷ *For. Rel.*, 1867, p. 792.

³⁷⁸ Blaine, *Political Discussion*, etc., p. 234.

³⁷⁹ 49 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen. Rept.*, v. 6, No. 441, p. 3.

Mexico was received by the United States government, August 27, 1887; Mexico would not interfere with the domestic affairs of Guatemala.³⁸⁰

The ambition of Mexico to expand southward has been constantly thwarted by the State Department of the United States. The interest of Mexico has always been to keep the five republics of Central America separated, the easier to encroach on the desired territory when opportunity offered a chance for success.

The eight obstacles to Federation we have considered—any one of which would have proven serious,—together have been and are insurmountable.

CHAPTER XI

THE REALIZATION OF FEDERATION

The Central American statesmen and writers still keep before them the ideal of federation. Bonilla affirms that the

radical remedy for the perturbed states of Central America is the reestablishment of the nation proclaimed by the forefathers when they declared their independence.³⁸¹

Pector emphasizes the political and economic advantages of a federation, and insists that the project has gained ground since the failure of Barrios.³⁸² Suarez says that all the great thinkers of America and Europe agree in looking to the eventual great Central American republic.³⁸³

The partisans of union have increased in number and influence.³⁸⁴ The following proclamation of President Arango of Salvador at the 1911 Centennial of the first effort for independence is typical.

In exerting ourselves to give to the celebration a luster any dignity worthy of the event it commemorates, let us keep clearly before us the purpose that its greatness must not be lost, and that

³⁸⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1887, p. 127.

³⁸¹ Bonilla, *Wilson Doct.*, p. 19.

³⁸² Pector, *Les richesses*, etc., pref. VII.

³⁸³ Suarez, pp. 18, 28.

³⁸⁴ Perigny, p. 243. Bonsal, *Am. Med.*, p. 348.

in deed we shall sincerely prepare ourselves to celebrate in 1921, the year of the Centennial of Central American independence, reformation with the other republics of our isthmus of a single Central American government. This purpose will be the best offering we can make at the foot of the beautiful monument which Salvador is about to consecrate to the heroes of 1811. This in my opinion, would be a fitting act on the part of our government, a crowning glory of my political career. I pray this union may be realized; and I shall be willing to feel that in virtue of such a result carried to a successful end by the free will of our sister republics I might perhaps be the last President of Salvador.³⁸⁵

On the other hand, the federation is regarded as an ideal very difficult to realize. History shows that to attempt to obtain this union either by diplomatic means or by force gives little promise of success.³⁸⁶ Yet President Cabrera of Guatemala recently said,

Central American Union is a beautiful idea, a consummation toward which all true Central American patriots should labor with noble, unselfish aims. But I fear that like your own union, and all other great nations, it will be made only with the bayonet.³⁸⁷

A Latin-American author writes that a political confederation founded in elements such as Central America presents, necessitates a thorough national education, an active public life, and strong moral antecedents, which are perhaps impossible in Latin-America.³⁸⁸ Testimony such as this, together with the teaching of Central American history, convinces many students that all that can be expected from a confederation of Central America is an alliance or contract easily broken.³⁸⁹

If it should happen that a federation could be effected, it would necessarily be a Federal union like that of the United States, not a centralized one, since it must combine such diverse countries as prosperous Costa Rica and poverty-stricken Nicaragua.³⁹⁰ Neither economic questions, nor

³⁸⁵ Pan Am. Bull. No. 33, 1911, p. 1061.

³⁸⁶ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 66.

³⁸⁷ Palmer, p. 297.

³⁸⁸ Abasolo, p. 45.

³⁸⁹ Sears, p. 501.

³⁹⁰ *Centro-Am. Enero*, 1909, p. 19.

differences in laws, duties, or currency need prevent a union. Indeed, Rey holds that to unify the domestic legislation of the states of Central America would not be desirable, since local sentiments are very marked.³⁹¹ Thus the only possible form of federation would leave the little states what they are, that is to say, little groups in which the governor is nearly all-powerful, since the influence of the central government would only make itself felt in general affairs.³⁹² The way would remain open for the ambitious, strong man to set his heart on the supreme power.

Thus we are drawn irresistably to the conclusion expressed by Minister Logan in a message to Mr. Blaine, May 24, 1881, that but a single agency, the protectorate of a powerful country, can make a union possible in Central America.³⁹³

The stability without which Central America may not prosper, whether united in one state, or split up as at present, can be attained only by outside help. The strength of the United States must be put at the service of its small and weak neighbor. As long ago as 1857, Karl von Scherzer, the Austrian traveler, reports that most of the Central Americans believed "a coalition with the great sister republic of the North" the remedy for the ills of the country.³⁹⁴

But since annexation is undesirable for the United States, and a permanent protectorate is repulsive to Central America, the only feasible course is for the United States to extend its protection temporarily, until the new federation is well-established. The Platt amendment which determines our present policy in Cuba, offers a precedent for future action in Central America on a far wider scale than has yet been attempted; and there is no reason why Central America should fear such a status as that of Cuba, nominally independent, though under the strict surveillance of the United States.³⁹⁵ Therefore Moncada,

³⁹¹ Rey, p. 26.

³⁹² *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 40.

³⁹³ 49 Cong., 1 Sess., *Sen Repts.*, v. 6, No. 941, Logan to Blaine.

³⁹⁴ Scherzer, *Travels*, etc., p. 319.

³⁹⁵ Fox, p. 155. *Am. For. Policy by a Diplomatist*, p. 95.

Ex-minister of the Interior in Nicaragua, reasons with the Democrats and Liberals of Central America, who advocate non-interference, saying:

Cuba lost nothing by accepting the generous hand which the American people extended to her in the hour of her birth into republican life. All beings and all nations must pass through a period of infancy, during which they need wise, prudent, and energetic direction. They might of their own vitality reach the stage of maturity, but this could be accomplished only by passing through a long period of sanguinary strife, as was the case with France, England, Italy, and as is now happening to the unfortunate states of Central America.³⁹⁶

The trouble with the policy of the Washington administration has been its piece-meal method of procedure by which Nicaragua and Honduras as the worst offenders have been singled out for intervention. The situation in Guatemala has been somewhat less acute, but may also at any time require the active interference of the United States.

In Nicaragua, the intervention of the United States is teaching the people what peace really means. A prominent Nicaraguan has said, that the American occupation has been a great blessing, in that it has shown the people what could be done if law, order, and decency were established.³⁹⁷

The justification of the measures taken by the United States is contained in the following note to the Nicaraguan government, through Minister Weitzel, September 18, 1912:

Under the Washington Convention, the United States has a moral mandate to exert its influence for the preservation of the general peace of Central America, which is seriously menaced by the present rising, and to this end in the strict enforcement of the Washington Conventions and loyal support of their aims and purposes, all the Central American republics will find means of valuable coöperation. These are among the important moral, political, and material interests to be protected.³⁹⁸

The treaty between the United States, which was based upon the idea of a veiled protectorate, and was ratified in

³⁹⁶ Moncada, p. 11.

³⁹⁷ *Outlook*, Jan. 3, 1914, p. 20.

³⁹⁸ *Am. Yr. Bk.*, 1912, p. 81.

1916, was of advantage to both countries, as well as to Central America as a whole. Unfortunately the benefits secured by the United States are well understood by Central Americans, while those of Nicaragua are little appreciated.³⁹⁹ It is felt that the United States has perpetrated an injustice on a weak neighbor. The American Marines are still daily hoisting the American flag at Managua, which constitutes a permanent affront to the Latin-American peoples, and arouses their indignation. Moncada seems to be in the small minority, when he states that Nicaragua, saved by the United States from the aggression of foreign powers, should not deny the right of American intervention in its internal affairs.⁴⁰⁰ Latin-America protested with practical unanimity. *El Diaro* of Salvador said August 14, 1914,

The time is ripe for joint Central American action to show the united Central American spirit. The autonomy of the country is at stake.

El Cronista of Honduras said August 7, 1914,

American interference in the land of the lakes (Nicaragua) will not stop, and the new feature of the protectorate still threatens the other small republics.

In September 30, 1913, a manifesto was issued from the Salvadorean people to the people of the United States, in which was voiced in protest, "the representation of mass meetings held in every city and hamlet of the republic."⁴⁰¹

The common complaint against the policy of the United States government is that it destroys the hope of a federation of the five republics; an impression is abroad even in the United States, that the American administration is acting contrary to the ideas expressed by its own statesmen

³⁹⁹ The United States government may intervene to protect Nicaragua's independence and regulate finance; the United States pays \$3,000,000 for exclusive right to build a canal; and receives the lease of a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, and of Great and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean Sea.

⁴⁰⁰ Moneada, p. 29.

⁴⁰¹ Manifesto from the Salvadorean people to people of the United States.

in the past, and is opposed to federation. Whether this suspicion is justified or not, the present policy makes for disunion; it would seem to be the wisdom of true statecraft, since intervention in at least three of the states will be necessary for many years to come, to intervene in such a way as to remove the obstacles to general progress and satisfy the national aspirations of the whole people. Rather than continue a piece-meal method of extending the provisions of the Platt Amendment over Central America, with decrease of influence and increase of bitterness, the United States should undertake the federation of Central America and then extend over it the same guardianship as it exercises over Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua.

The five Central American republics are entitled to have a single government, for they have the elements of a genuine national spirit. Their common patriotism is shown by the recent organization of a Central American Defense League at San Salvador, which has now extended to all the Central American republics. Its creation is due to the alarm felt on account of the protectorate project and is an attempt through its representatives in the United States to defend its cause before the American people and government.⁴⁰² Secretary Root, at the first Central American Conference, concisely summed up the case for Central American nationality.

You are one people in fact, your citizenship is interchangeable—your race, your religion, your customs, your laws, your lineage, your consanguinity and ties of social relations, your sympathies, your aspirations, and your hopes for the future are the same.⁴⁰³

Our own diplomatic traditions also favor the union of the five republics; if this fact has not been sufficiently demonstrated, Webster's statement of 1857 may be quoted:

How desirable it is that those states should be united under one government. The President cannot willingly give up the

⁴⁰² Bonilla, *Wilson, Doct.*, p. 27.

⁴⁰³ *Am. J. of Inter'l Law*, 1913, p. 832, Buchanan, *Report J. C. Am. Peace Conf.*, p. 27. Compare Suarez, p. 12. Colquhoun, *Greater Am.*, p. 148.

hope that this will again be accomplished. There is little probability that Central America, now a point so interesting to all nations, can ever attain her proper dignity and proper destiny while divided into so many small states.⁴⁰⁴

Blaine expressed the same idea in 1881:

In reference to the union of the Central American republics under one federal government, the United States is ready to avow that no subject appeals more strongly to its sympathy, nor more decidedly to its judgement. Nor is this a new policy. For many years this government has urged upon the Central American states the importance of such a union to the creation of a well-ordered and constitutionally governed republic, and our Ministers have been instructed to impress this upon individual governments to which they have been accredited, and to the Central American statesmen with whom they have been associated.⁴⁰⁵

To secure this great end—the union of the Central American republics under one well-ordered federated government, in place of the national and international anarchy of today—the United States would be clearly justified by the principals of international law, in adopting a policy of temporary intervention.

If intervention is to take place, the Monroe Doctrine forces the obligation upon the United States. This country should hold itself responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Central America, or repudiate the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Root did not hesitate to take this position, when Secretary of State in 1904. In a speech before the New England Society of New York, he said,

And if we are to maintain this doctrine (the Monroe Doctrine) which is vital to our national life and safety, at the same time when we say to the other powers of the world, "You shall not push your remedies for wrong against these republics to the point of occupying their territory," we are bound to say that, whenever the wrong cannot be otherwise redressed, we ourselves will see that it is redressed.⁴⁰⁶

In the face of the necessities of the situation for Central America and the United States, the "consent of the

⁴⁰⁴ 34 Cong., 1 Sess., *S. Ex. Doc. 25*, p. 20.

⁴⁰⁵ Blaine, *Pol. Discussion*, p. 386.

⁴⁰⁶ Quoted in Bonsal, *Am. Med.*, p. 347.

governed" need cause no qualms of conscience, though this be "one of our most sacred traditions," especially as Bancroft points out it is "historically true that we are generally able to persuade the governed to consent whenever we desire—willingly or otherwise."⁴⁰⁷ Surely the consent would not be long delayed, when once Central America was assured that the vision of her patriots was to be realized in the federation of Central America.

A very grand and beautiful thing for us Central Americans to be able to regulate our own destiny through our own strength alone! I have entertained the illusion that after reverses and disappointments, we might arrive like other nations at the goal of stable national government, but unfortunately civilization will not wait. The United States are already responsible in the eyes of the world for things and events in Central America. The Monroe Doctrine linked With the Knox note has placed the great republic in this situation and in order to comply with its duty, there is no middle term, the only course is intervention, based on high ideals of justice and humanity, and always directed toward the grave object of North American Federation.⁴⁰⁸

Of course such action as we anticipate for the United States may be misunderstood or mininterpreted, but the need is great enough to justify the risk, and the result will fully repay the intervention of a strong neighbor on behalf of the weak, for the Central American Federation would constitute an ideal state. The total area would be between that of California and Texas, about 173,000 square miles, embracing a portion of the continent 800 or 900 miles long and 30 to 300 miles wide.⁴⁰⁹ Here in a land of such beauty that Columbus thought he had discovered the terrestrial Paradise, which is surpassed nowhere else in the world in the variety of its natural resources, which can comfortably support from 25,000,000 to 50,000,000 of people,⁴¹⁰ in a land placed at the center of the commercial highways of civilization, Central America may take her rightful place as an equal among the American republics.

⁴⁰⁷ Bancroft, H. H., *New Pacific*, p. 174.

⁴⁰⁸ Moncada, pp. 29, 30.

⁴⁰⁹ Costa Rica, 23,000 sq. m; Guatamala, 47,500; Honduras, 44,275; Nicaragua, 51,700; Salvador, 7,225.

⁴¹⁰ Fiallos, p. 141. Palmer, p. 302.

In the National Park of San José on a national holiday November 5, 1911, two thousand school children gathered. After saluting the flags, all present joined in singing the five national anthems of the republics of Central America, as though by a harmony of song to symbolize their united country.⁴¹¹ Surely it is none other than the spirit of the patriots of Central American independence and Federation.

CHAPTER XII

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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JAPAN'S NEW RAILWAY LOAN TO CHINA

Chinese papers just to hand seem not overpleased with the terms of the revised Kirin-Changchun railway loan recently concluded between Japan and China. Says the *Peking Gazette*:

The revised agreement of the Kirin-Changchun railway loan was signed by the Chinese and Japanese representatives at the ministry of communications October 3. The conclusion of the revised agreement furnishes another instance of the value to Japan of suitable friends and protégés among cabinet ministers. In the new agreement China is alleged to borrow a certain sum from the Japanese with interest and commission in the usual manner. The Japanese, in addition to getting the interest and commission for the money lent, will practically own the railway built with the money for a period of not less than thirty years. With the exception of a figurehead director the entire employed staff of the railway will be appointed by Japanese controllers. And for the privilege of controlling the railway the Japanese are to get twenty per cent of the net profits of the railway as bonus. Finally, all the money is to be deposited in Japanese instead of Chinese banks. An important point is that when the so-called revised agreement was submitted to parliament for examination the government was told that the nature of the agreement was such that unless wholesale alterations were made it would be impossible for parliament to approve the same. Now taking advantage of the absence of parliament, the cabinet is openly violating the advice of the old parliament by making wholesale concessions to the Japanese. With the exception of the shortening of the period from forty to thirty years the original terms are entirely conceded to the Japanese. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the return of the old parliament is so firmly opposed. A perusal of the following particulars will show the nature of the loan agreement.

Amount: Yen 6,500,000 (this means a loss of at least 25 per cent to China on account of the existing rate of exchange). Interest 5 per cent per annum. Net proceeds 91.5 per cent (\$2,150,000 of the total amount has already been paid).

Term: Thirty years.

Security: The properties and receipts of the railway. If the railway should be unable to meet the obligations and the Chinese government should fail to make good, the lenders (Japanese) will take possession of the railway.

Management: The Chinese government shall appoint a director to "supervise" the affairs of the business. During the period of the loan the direction and management of the railway shall be entrusted to the loan company until the loan is completely repaid.

Japanese Control: Three Japanese will be selected to take charge of engineering, traffic and accounting work. One of these three will be appointed to represent and exercise the power and duty of the loan company.

Employés: With the exception of the chiefs all other employés shall be jointly appointed by the director and the representative of the loan company.

Profits: Twenty per cent of the net profits of the railway shall be given to the loan company.

Banking: Traffic and other receipts shall be deposited in Chinese currency in Japanese banks.

Purchase of Materials: Chinese products are to be given preference when materials are to be purchased for the railway (sic).

Chinese Rights: Police, judicial and taxation rights shall remain in the hands of the Chinese government.

Extension: If the Chinese government should decide in future to extend or build branch lines to this railway and money is needed for the same, the loan company shall first be consulted for a loan.